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ABSTRACT 
The foundation of property law has been much debated in recent 
years, as several scholars have sought to provide a theoretical alternative to 
what they call the dominant, “law-and-economics” approach to property. 
In place of the law-and-economics approach, these scholars advance a new 
theoretical approach, which I call “the new progressive property.” At its 
core, this new approach favors rules thought to promote the collective well-
being of the larger community while ensuring that relatively disadvantaged 
members of society have access to certain basic resources. This Article 
explores the boundaries and practical implications of the new progressive 
property. To do so, I focus on two potential examples of this theoretical 
approach related to low-income housing: the federal Section 8 housing 
voucher program and local rent-control ordinances. I argue that Section 8 
is a better example than rent control of the new progressive-property 
approach, even though rent control has previously been identified as a 
practical example of the new progressive property and Section 8 has not. 
I then turn to examine a deep conflict at the intersection of Section 8 
and rent control, which presents an important opportunity to further test 
and refine the new progressive property. In particular, I argue that this 
underexamined low-income housing conflict provides good reasons to 
abandon rent control, even from a progressive-property perspective. In 
addition, the low-income housing conflict between Section 8 and rent 
control sheds light on the ambiguous relationship between law-and-
economics analysis and the progressive-property framework. More 
specifically, I argue that the conflict between rent control and Section 8 
demonstrates that even the most basic law-and-economics tools must be 
incorporated into a progressive-property framework to achieve the ends of 
the new progressive property.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For much of the past decade, groups of landlords in rent-controlled 
jurisdictions have sought to exploit the intersection between the federal 
Section 8 housing voucher program1 and local rent-control ordinances,2 
arguing that the baseline eviction standards set forth in the federal 
program preempt the more tenant-protective eviction controls present in 
rent-control ordinances. More specifically, these landlords have issued 
form notices purporting to evict Section 8–assisted tenants in 
rent-controlled units for reasons acceptable under federal regulations but 
precluded by local rent-control ordinances. Predictably, these efforts 
prompted a spate of state and federal litigation by tenants-rights 
advocates.3 Although the preemption issues central to this litigation are 
important in their own right, beyond them lurks a larger, more 
interesting, and more significant problem: namely, the underlying conflict 
at the intersection of Section 8 and local rent-control ordinances, despite 
their superficially similar progressive aims. 
This low-income housing conflict is important in its own right, but its 
true significance lies in what it can teach us about the broader picture 
and theoretical foundations of property law. In recent years, several 
scholars have advanced a new foundation for the law of property, based 
in part on the claim that property law and property theory implicate 
plural and incommensurable values. These accounts also suggest that the 
dominant conception of property today, which focuses on protecting 
individual property rights and maximizing the efficient distribution of 
resources, is inadequate both for conflict resolution and for institutional 
 
 1. In 1974, Congress created the federal Section 8 housing voucher program “[f]or the 
purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting 
economically mixed housing.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006). For a more detailed discussion of 
Section 8, see discussion infra Part III.A. 
 2. Given the long and varied history of rent control in this country, local rent-control 
ordinances come in a variety of forms and may be designed to achieve varying ends. Nevertheless, 
one can find broad similarities and common themes. For example, many local rent-control 
ordinances are designed, in whole or in part, to mitigate the displacement of “senior citizens, 
persons on fixed incomes and low and moderate income households” from “decent, safe and 
sanitary housing.” See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.01 (2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/ReEuEn. For a more detailed discussion of the history and variety of local rent-control 
ordinances generally, and LARSO in particular, see discussion infra Part III.B.  
 3. See, e.g., Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009). This 
litigation has largely ended in defeat for the landlord groups’ position. Id. at 1215 (holding eviction 
restrictions in local rent-control ordinances are not preempted by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s Section 8 regulations “to the extent the HUD regulation[s] permit[] eviction 
to obtain a higher rent[]”).  
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design.4 By their own lights, these recent accounts of property law and 
property theory are “progressive” and bear a “family resemblance” to 
each other.5 Accordingly, I coin and use the term “the new progressive 
property” to refer to the common values and ends these accounts 
endorse.6 
 
 4. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 743 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property]; see also ERIC T. 
FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND xiv 
(2007) (claiming that “[a]t the center of today’s debate . . . lies a collective failure . . . to think clearly 
and intently about the institution [of private property],” which, “[i]n operation[,] . . . is less an 
individual right than a tool society uses to promote overall social good”); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 3, 6–7 (2000) (noting the pervasiveness of the 
Blackstonian “ownership model” of property, which is both “misleading and morally deficient,” 
because it fails to consider the multiple “tensions within the concept of property itself,” the 
resolution of which requires “controversial value judgments . . . between conflicting interests”); 
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 100 (2003) (emphasis 
omitted) (noting that the “interdependent nature of property interests—the fact that protection of 
one person’s property interest so often affects the property interests of others—explains why 
property rights so often lack, and should lack, presumptive power”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property 
as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938–58 (2005) (suggesting that the appropriate vision of 
property “starts with an understanding of ownership, not primarily as a means of separating 
individuals . . . but of tying them together into social groups”); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-
Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 
1243 (2005) (noting that in contrast to libertarian theories of property, “the freedom-promoting 
[property] standpoint” for which he argues “does not conceive of property as a fixed and immutable 
category” but rather a “dynamic institution” and a series of evolving rules).  
 5. In calling these recent accounts “progressive,” I use a label that many of the authors of 
these recent accounts have themselves adopted, and one that some commentators about these 
recent accounts have adopted as well. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 
supra note 4, at 743 (entitled “A Statement of Progressive Property”); see also Jane B. Baron, The 
Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 924, 924 & n.12 (2010) (grouping 
together many of the accounts discussed in this Article under the label “progressive theories,” in 
contrast to “informational theories” of property). My claim that these accounts have a close family 
relationship to one another is echoed by some recent progressive accounts themselves and the 
works of some commentators. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 & n.7 (2009) [hereinafter Alexander, The 
Social-Obligation Norm] (gathering “examples of other scholarly works that bear a family 
resemblance” to the works in that Symposium); James J. Kelly, Jr., Land Trusts that Conserve 
Communities, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 69–70 (2009) (grouping together many of the accounts 
discussed in this Article, and suggesting that community land trusts provide a way to realize these 
accounts’ common values and ends).  
 6. I am mindful that this broad grouping brings together a wide variety of potentially 
divergent theories and that some scholars whose work is included under this umbrella term might 
have reservations about the wholesale inclusion of their work under this label. See, e.g., Jedediah 
Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 949 (2009) (raising 
questions about the implications of Alexander’s Article, despite Alexander’s inclusion of his 
previous work within the larger “family” of progressive accounts). But see Gregory S. Alexander, 
Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1030–32 (2011) [hereinafter Alexander, 
Pluralism and Property] (including Purdy’s work as an example of the pluralistic social-obligation 
 
1109 The New Progressive Property 
 1113 
The new progressive property is both prescriptive and at least 
partially descriptive: On the one hand, the new progressive property is 
prescriptive insofar as it seeks to prescribe new or revive forsaken 
normative approaches to property law and theory.7 On the other hand, 
the new progressive property is at least partially descriptive insofar as it 
contends that American property law, at times, already recognizes the 
goals it endorses.8 For example, rent control has already been identified 
by some recent progressive accounts as a practical example of the 
theoretical ideal for which they argue.9 To take another example, I argue 
in this Article that the federal Section 8 housing voucher program, which 
has previously been overlooked in recent progressive-property accounts, 
fits the descriptive characteristics of the new progressive property at least 
as well as many local rent-control ordinances.10 Accordingly, Section 8 
and rent control are independently useful programs to examine the new 
progressive property in some detail; and the low-income housing conflict 
at their intersection provides an even more fruitful testing ground for the 
new progressive property in theory and practice. 
Already, these recent progressive-property accounts have sparked 
 
theory he advances). Nevertheless, the term “the new progressive property” is useful because it 
captures essential common themes, values, and characteristics found across these accounts, which 
are discussed in substantial detail below. See infra Part II, and especially notes 22–28 and 
accompanying text.  
I am also mindful that some critics of the new progressive property have questioned whether these 
recent accounts possess a degree of consensus substantial enough for practical implementation. See, 
e.g., Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 960 (2009) (noting that “[i]t is hard to be against human 
flourishing, and a concept that is in one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic 
social thought, modern virtue ethics, some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . . 
but one can question the degree of consensus required for implementation in a legal regime”). 
Indeed, this Article explores and addresses this criticism through its close comparison of the federal 
Section 8 housing voucher program and local rent-control ordinances to the values and ends of the 
new progressive-property approach. See infra Parts III.A and II.B. 
 7. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 819 (arguing that “although 
American property law implicitly includes a robust social-obligation norm,” courts and scholars 
must work to fully identify, develop, and apply this norm); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–64 (2009) (stating that “the purpose of this Article is . . . to reintroduce 
the Aristotelian ethical tradition into discussions of property and land-use as an approach with much 
to offer, one that has been neglected by contemporary property scholars”).  
 8. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 (arguing that 
“American property law at times and in some places recognizes something like the social-obligation 
norm I propose here,” if “only sporadically and implicitly”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 883 (stating 
that “the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in [State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971),] 
exemplifies, in many ways, the rich pluralism of the approach I am advocating”).  
 9. See infra Part III.B.  
 10. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, IV.B. 
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detailed criticism,11 thoughtful commentary,12 and enthusiastic 
acclaim.13 What remains to be done is a close examination of the new 
progressive property on some of its own terms by carefully considering 
the plural and incommensurable underlying values, purposes, and social 
relationships14 that recent progressive-property accounts seek to serve. 
Such an approach should also take into account a potentially “vexing 
problem” that progressive-property theorists have already recognized: 
namely, what reasoning processes are needed to balance the plural 
values of the new progressive property in practice?15 In addition, such 
an approach should examine the new progressive property on the terms 
advanced by some of its critics, especially the claims for and criticisms of 
the new progressive property as they relate to institutional relationships 
and institutional design.16 Because recent progressive-property accounts 
emphasize the importance of contextual analysis,17 these tasks will be 
served best by testing the new progressive property against specific 
property regimes and doctrines that embody some or all of the 
characteristics of recent progressive accounts. 
This Article addresses all of these needs by examining the new 
progressive property through a series of focusing lenses: namely, the 
federal Section 8 housing voucher program, local rent-control 
ordinances, and the potential for conflict that arises out of their 
intersection. Some have suggested that the recent progressive-property 
accounts cohere as little more than a grab-bag of largely unrelated values 
 
 11. E.g., Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
889 (2009); Smith, supra note 6; Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue 
Ethics? A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009).  
 12. E.g., Baron, supra note 5. 
 13. E.g., Kelly, supra note 5.  
 14. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743 
(claiming that “[p]roperty implicates plural and incommensurable values . . . such as environmental 
stewardship, civic responsibility, and . . . human . . . dignity,” and that the purpose of property law 
ought to be the promotion of these values, which “implicates moral and political conceptions of just 
social relationships” and just distribution of resources). 
 15. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1051 (claiming that “property 
theorists who are pluralist need to attend to the vexing problem of . . . exactly, analytically, what 
[reasoning process] does this balancing process [between incommensurable values] involve?”). 
 16. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 970 (claiming that “if there is anything legal scholars do 
better than economists, social scientists, and philosophers, it is institutional design,” and arguing 
that legal scholars should embrace this role).  
 17. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 
(claiming that deliberation about property entitlements should be the product of contextual 
reflection).  
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lacking practical consistency.18 If, contrary to these critical suggestions, 
the recent progressive-property accounts do provide a level of substantial 
consensus capable of both implementation in legal regimes and cohesion 
in future academic debates,19 then they should be able to provide 
relatively consistent and predictable answers in most situations to the 
following related questions. First, to what extent can specific property 
regimes be justified in both absolute and relative terms on the basis of 
the values identified by the recent progressive-property accounts? 
Second, if conflicts arise between regimes that are based on the sorts of 
norms and values defended in recent progressive-property accounts, how 
should these conflicts be resolved? 
This Article tests the new progressive-property approach on exactly 
these grounds. Part II reviews the recent progressive-property accounts, 
focusing both on their common themes and on the various criticisms they 
have engendered. Part III then explains how both Section 8 and rent 
control fit the descriptive components of the new progressive-property 
accounts, and why considering whether they are good examples of the 
new progressive property is useful. 
Part IV of the Article begins by examining the conflict between 
Section 8 and local rent-control ordinances highlighted by recent 
litigation. Part IV then examines what light this conflict sheds on both the 
descriptive story and the prescriptive recommendations of the new 
progressive property. In particular, I suggest that the most basic tools 
from what many recent progressive accounts refer to generally as “law-
and-economics theory,” “law-and-economics analysis,” or the “law-and-
economics approach” to property20 have important, even necessary, 
 
 18. E.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 960.  
 19. Cf. id. (noting that “[i]t is hard to be against human flourishing, and a concept that is in 
one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic social thought, modern virtue ethics, 
some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . . but one can question the degree of 
consensus required for implementation in a legal regime”). 
 20. For examples of this collective treatment, see, for example, Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 750 (noting that “[i]n recent years, law-and-economics analysis 
has dominated property scholarship,” and declaring a goal of “offer[ing] an alternative to that mode 
of analyzing property disputes,” which, though it “certainly provides important insights into a 
remarkably wide range of property issues,” suffers from limited vision and an impoverished analysis 
of moral values and moral issues) and Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823 (claiming that his aim is not to 
discredit law-and-economics analysis of property theory across the board, “but merely to explore 
several problems raised for the operation of law and economics within the discrete area of land-use 
scholarship”). For a more thorough discussion of the treatment of “law-and-economics analysis” in 
recent progressive-property accounts, see infra Part II, and especially notes 53–62 and 
accompanying text. Using the term “law and economics” as such an umbrella term, as it is used in 
recent progressive-property accounts, is deliberately imprecise, blurring long-standing and critical 
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roles to play in the new progressive property. More specifically, I claim 
that the most basic tools from these law-and-economics approaches to 
property are important, even within a progressive-property framework, 
to predict and respond to conflicts between property regimes based on 
progressive-property norms. In so doing, I help resolve the previously 
ambiguous role of these tools within a progressive-property framework. 
As a related point, I argue that the use of these tools may also be 
necessary to ensure that progressive-property regimes encourage rather 
than distort the kinds of behavior that many recent progressive-property 
accounts aim to inculcate. In addition, I suggest that the conflict between 
Section 8 and rent control can be attributed, in part, to inconsistencies in 
the ways that these programs balance and promote some of the plural 
values identified by recent progressive-property accounts. Balancing such 
plural values is a key characteristic of the new progressive property, and 
I argue that Section 8 provides a better example of this balancing 
approach than rent control. Finally, at each step this Article attempts to 
address one of the “vexing problems” already identified by some 
progressive theorists21: namely, what reasoning processes should be used 
to balance the incommensurable values that undergird the new 
progressive property? 
II. A REVIEW OF RECENT PROGRESSIVE-PROPERTY ACCOUNTS 
To begin, it is necessary to provide a brief introduction to the general 
picture of progressive property that emerges from recent accounts. The 
degree of consensus among recent progressive-property accounts is, as 
noted above, an open issue, but several common traits can be 
identified.22 After summarizing these traits, I will examine each in more 
 
differences between radically different descriptive and prescriptive accounts in an attempt to focus 
on a few common themes and techniques. Of course, the authors of recent progressive-property 
accounts are well aware of this and use the umbrella term advisedly. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748–49 n.8 (noting that he uses “the terms ‘law and economics’ 
and ‘the law-and-economics tradition’ to embrace all normative positions that evaluate alternative 
possible legal regimes by reference to some scalar metric, be it ‘welfare,’ ‘wealth,’ ‘utility,’ 
‘preference,’ or some cognate metric”). In this Article, I simply follow this same terminological 
usage of these progressive-property accounts. When I discuss the “basic law-and-economics tools” 
that, I argue, should be incorporated to progressive-property accounts in specific ways, I refer in this 
Article to basic considerations of overall efficiency and assumptions about the economic incentives 
facing various actors, see infra note 63, while recognizing that other elaborate tools from the law-
and-economics approach may also have a place in a progressive-property framework, see infra note 
64. 
 21. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6.  
 22. The summary of the new progressive property in this Section is based largely on the 
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detail. First, the new progressive property is characterized by its deeply 
communitarian nature23—by its claims that property law should seek to 
improve the character of the social relationships and the health of the 
communities from which it emerges.24 Second, the recent progressive-
property accounts tend to be hostile towards absolutist or libertarian 
conceptions of private property, favoring instead an approach that takes 
into account a wider range of values that private property arguably 
serves.25 Third, most recent progressive-property accounts also tend to 
express skepticism about descriptions and prescriptions of property law 
that are rooted largely in analysis of economic incentives and 
 
following three types of sources: First, this summary is based on the recent “Statement of 
Progressive Property” in the Cornell Law Review. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive 
Property, supra note 4. Second, this summary is based on related pieces by the signatories to that 
Statement. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4; Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra 
note 5; Peñalver, supra note 7; Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free 
and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). Third, this summary is based on those 
other works whose close resemblance to these accounts has elsewhere been expressly noted. See, 
e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 n.7 (collecting examples of other 
accounts “that bear a family resemblance to the social-obligation theory developed in this Article,” 
most of which are referred to in this Article below). 
 23. For an example of the generally communitarian nature of recent progressive-property 
accounts, see, for example, Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 
744 (“Property enables and shapes community life. Property law . . . can render relationships within 
communities either exploitative and humiliating or liberating and ennobling . . . [and] should 
establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to a free and democratic society.”). Of 
course, the label “communitarian” is a loaded one, which is often applied more frequently as an 
epithet by critics than a badge of identification. E.g., Daniel Bell,  in Communitarianism, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/. This general communitarian trait is not 
equally prominent in all recent progressive-property accounts; however, the general characteristic is 
common to most, and the specific term has been at least tentatively adopted by some of these 
accounts. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 786 (suggesting 
opportunities for courts “to act in creative and socially transformative ways, reaching decisions on 
the basis of the thick communitarian social-obligation norm” defended elsewhere in his article) 
(emphasis added). In claiming that the recent progressive-property accounts are generally 
“communitarian,” I mean only that they tend to place greater relative importance on social context, 
social relationships, and the health of the community than the alternative theoretical approaches 
that they criticize, and that they tend to make normative claims based on the value of community 
itself and an individual’s relation to the community more often than these same alternative 
theoretical approaches. See Singer, supra note 22, at 1035 (noting that “[w]hile efficiency analysis 
focuses on satisfying individual interests, Alexander’s more communitarian and dignity-based 
approach assumes that we have obligations to others in our community and to those with whom we 
form relationships”); cf., e.g., Bell, supra (identifying different strands of communitarian thought, 
including “methodological claims about the importance of tradition and social context for moral and 
political reasoning” and “normative claims about the value of community”). 
 24. See infra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.  
 25. See infra notes 39–51 and accompanying text. 
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motivations.26 At the same time, most of the recent progressive accounts 
agree that this law-and-economics approach is ascendant in 
contemporary property scholarship.27 Fourth, in place of a focus on 
maximizing economic efficiency or preserving the negative freedom of 
landowners, almost all recent progressive-property accounts assert that 
property law should incorporate alternative systems of values. More 
specifically, recent progressive-property accounts often invoke human 
flourishing as the proper end at which property rules should aim,28 and 
some progressive-property accounts suggest that systems of virtue ethics 
might provide a useful means for property law to reach this end.29 As a 
result, scholars writing from the perspective of the new progressive 
property often display a relatively greater tolerance for property regimes 
that produce inefficiencies or infringe upon individual property rights, so 
long as those regimes also serve certain other positive values identified 
 
 26. See infra notes 53–62 and accompanying text.  
 27. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 28. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. By invoking “flourishing” or similar 
concepts, even those recent progressive-property accounts that do not expressly refer to systems of 
virtue ethics seek to appropriate a normative alternative to the norms that support the law-and-
economics and libertarian approaches to property theory. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 864 
(noting that “[u]nlike both utilitarian consequentialism and deontological libertarianism, virtue-
based ethical theories in the Aristotelian tradition adopt an agent-centered approach to determining 
right action” that “[d]raw on a substantive conception of the human good or flourishing”). By 
“flourishing,” these accounts refer expressly or implicitly to a concept that can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the concept is defined as the ultimate end of human action, 
pursued for its own sake, complete and self-sufficient, the presence of which makes life desirable 
and lacking in nothing. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE I.1.1094a1-3, 
I.2.1094a19-20, I.7.1097a24-33, 1097b6-21. (Sir David Ross trans.). For a useful short summary of 
the various alternative translations of the original term eudaimonia, see, for example, Christopher 
Shields, Aristotle, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/aristotle/ (gathering sources and 
noting the dispute as to whether the term eudaimonia is best translated as “flourishing,” or 
“happiness,” or “living well,” or simply transliterated and left untranslated).  
 29. By invoking “virtue ethics,” some recent progressive accounts invoke specific ethical 
systems that are aimed at this ultimate goal of human flourishing. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 
864 (gathering sources and noting that “[v]irtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in 
certain characteristic modes of behavior that are conducive to human flourishing”). Even systems of 
virtue ethics that are deliberately removed from Aristotelian roots tend to revolve around this 
central concept of flourishing. See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archivs/win2010/entries/ethics-virtue/ (noting that “[t]he concept of 
eudaimonia . . . is central to any modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and usually employed even by 
virtue ethicists who deliberately divorce themselves from Aristotle”). For a more fulsome discussion 
of related ethical systems in the context of recent progressive-property accounts, see, for example, 
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 760–72; Peñalver, supra note 7, at 864–
69. 
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by recent progressive-property accounts.30 
A. The Communitarian Nature of the New Progressive Property 
The most common characteristic of recent progressive-property 
accounts, and arguably the most significant, is their communitarian focus 
on the ways in which property law can and should shape social life and 
relationships between individuals.31 At the most basic level, the 
communitarian focus of the new progressive-property approach can be 
seen in its claim that property rules affect both individual property 
owners and the larger community, and the related suggestion that 
property law should account for this larger community interest in 
addition to the interests of individual owners.32 Perhaps more 
importantly, recent progressive-property accounts suggest that property 
law must focus on the nature of the community because its subject 
matter is uniquely and inseparably tied to the health of both the 
community and its individual members.33 
In other words, according to recent progressive-property accounts, 
property law is uniquely intertwined with the broader community from 
which it springs—so much so that it is impossible to truly understand 
property without reference to the broader community that gives it 
meaning.34 This communitarian focus has a practical bite: if property 
 
 30. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. As a practical example of this common 
trait, one recent progressive-property account cites the nondiscrimination mandate placed on 
private owners of places of public accommodation in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. 
 31. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 
(“Property enables and shapes community life. Property law can render relationships within 
communities either exploitative and humiliating or liberating and ennobling. Property law should 
establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to a free and democratic society.”); see 
also Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 751 (noting that a conception of the 
social-obligation norm that “links ownership’s social obligation with the idea of community . . . is 
the conception that I wish to examine most closely here”). 
 32. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON GOOD 15–16 (2003) (claiming that “[m]any times, how property is employed also affects 
the surrounding community—socially, economically, and ecologically—so the community and its 
interests must be taken into account”). 
 33. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 766 (noting that 
“[c]ommunities, including but not limited to the state, are the mediating vehicles through which we 
come to acquire the resources we need to flourish and to become fully socialized into the exercise of 
our capabilities”).  
 34. See Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 749 (arguing that what “is 
socially cognizable as property is only that form of access to resources that is consistent with human 
flourishing and community itself”); Purdy, supra note 4, at 1243, 1298 (arguing that property is “a 
social institution” because “property regimes set the terms on which people are able to recruit each 
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law is uniquely related to the health and well-being of the community, it 
should reflect a substantial concern for community interests; and 
individual private property rights should perhaps receive less protection 
than the individual rights protected by other areas of the law.35 More 
specifically, some recent progressive-property accounts argue that 
individual property claims deserve less protection than, for example, 
individual claims to artistic or political self-expression because of the 
uniquely communitarian nature of property law.36 However, progressive 
accounts also tend to argue that much of contemporary property law fails 
to incorporate these practical communitarian insights, reflecting instead 
an undue concern for individual interests at the expense of the 
community.37 
B. Individual Property Rights and the New Progressive Property 
Given their conclusion that property law and theory should be 
reoriented toward neglected plural and communitarian values,38 most 
recent progressive-property theorists reject what they call absolutist39 or 
 
other for social cooperation”); Singer, supra note 22, at 1049 (claiming that “[w]e cannot 
understand property law without understanding the social relationships it embodies and 
promotes”).  
 35. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 127 (arguing that private property rights are 
and should be “protected less” than individual rights in other areas of the law because they 
“involve[], far less often, the uniquely powerful normative claims that justify the ‘trumping’ or 
presumptive power of” of other types of individual rights); David Lametti, The Objects of Virtue, in 
PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 35–36 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, eds., 2010) 
(noting that “[t]he objects of property relations, contextually understood and valued, therefore, 
become a specific point of entry for the community’s imposition of values in property discourse”). 
 36. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 127 (noting that “because property claims so 
often involve . . . interdependent claims or allocational claims[,] the normative power of the values 
that these claimed rights assert is much more frequently matched by the normative power of the 
competing public interests than is true in other contexts. . . . [T]his is a routine occurrence in 
property cases”); Lametti, supra note 35, at 36 (suggesting that in the future, “land use will be 
increasingly subject to this communal concern, and the number of restrictions that reflect this 
dimension of ‘public in use’ will increase or become more explicit”). 
 37. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 252 (claiming that “[a]s commonly understood 
today in the United States, private property stands starkly opposed to holistic, ecological goals such 
as land health,” in part because “the main strands of contemporary ownership came together at a 
time when the liberated entrepreneur, not the healthy community, was the symbol of progress”).  
 38. See, e.g., Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1017, 1035–51 (arguing in 
support of a social obligation approach to property that is based on incommensurable plural 
values).  
 39. See, e.g., Kevin Gray, Land Law and Human Rights, in LAND LAW: ISSUES, DEBATES, 
POLICY 211, 222–23 (Louise Tee ed., 2002) (claiming that “[i]n most areas of property law there 
exists a tension between . . . the perspectives of the property absolutist and the property relativist,” 
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libertarian40 approaches to property law—approaches that, according to 
these recent progressive accounts, tend to unduly privilege individual 
property interests at the expense of the community.41 This theoretical 
rejection has practical significance,42 because it leads to a relatively 
broad tolerance for infringing upon individual property claims to serve 
communitarian or other values.43 For example, although many believe 
that an individual landowner’s right to exclude is the theoretical core of 
property,44 many new progressive accounts claim that this right is and 
should be compromised in the service of broader social obligations.45 
Compared to other property theories, therefore, recent progressive 
accounts suggest that such negative, individual property rights can 
relatively frequently be trumped, particularly when they conflict with the 
new progressive property’s commitment to values such as human dignity 
and development,46 distributive justice and equitable distribution of 
 
and suggesting that property absolutists “tend . . . [to] maintain that all regulatory interference with 
land use necessarily constitutes a compensable ‘taking’ of property”). 
 40. See, e.g., UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 4, at 159 (claiming that the American “tradition of 
‘negative’ constitutional rights, and our firm inclusion of property among those rights,” reflects an 
aspiration “toward a system characterized by ‘free-market, minimalist-state libertarianism,’” which 
reinforces the incorrect and impractical “notion that property is . . . defined by private law and 
insulated (by constitutional guarantee) from otherwise legitimate public demands”).  
 41. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 861 (noting that the absolutist “libertarian position 
that respect for individual property rights is all that matters, consequences be damned, is neither 
appealing nor workable” nor, ultimately, “acceptable even to its own practitioners”). 
 42. Some recent progressive accounts acknowledge that this figure of the absolutist 
private-property enthusiast, against whom the new progressive-property approach is partially drawn, 
is something of a bogeyman. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 39, at 222–23 (noting that “[t]here remain 
today few true property absolutists”). Nevertheless, the opposition of recent progressive-property 
accounts to the absolutist or deeply libertarian approach is significant, because it reflects a relatively 
broad tolerance in the new progressive property for compromising individual property claims. See 
id. at 240 (noting that the debate between absolutist and relativist theories of property impacts 
crucially important views “of the political balance to be maintained between individual and 
community interests”). 
 43. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 
(claiming that the pursuit of the values identified by the new progressive property requires 
“attentiveness to the effects of claiming and exercising property rights on others, including future 
generations, and on the natural environment and the non-human world”).  
 44. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
730 (1998) (arguing “that the right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ 
constituents of property—it is the sine qua non”).  
 45. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 747–48 (claiming that 
“[t]he core image of property rights . . . [in which] the owner has a right to exclude others and owes 
no further obligation” is misleading, and stating that the purpose of his progressive account is to 
draw attention to the social obligations of owners at the expense of individual rights such as the 
right to exclude).  
 46. See id. at 748, 768 (claiming that his “version of the social-obligation norm” is superior 
 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1122 
resources,47 and other traditionally underexamined rights and goods.48 
As a result, the new progressive-property approach tends to favor 
specific property regimes and policies such as restrictions on the terms 
and the marketing of home mortgages for low-income borrowers;49 
expansive interpretations of the public trust doctrine;50 and local rent-
control ordinances,51 which this Article examines in some detail.52 
C. The Contrast Between the New Progressive-Property and the 
Law-and-Economics Approaches 
In addition to their opposition toward libertarian approaches, most 
recent progressive-property accounts are skeptical about an approach to 
property law that they refer to as the “law-and-economics approach,” 
which they characterize as based largely on the analysis and projection of 
overall efficiency as expressed by contemporary market values.53 Most of 
the recent progressive accounts agree that the law-and-economics 
approach dominates the contemporary academic analysis of property 
 
because it “enables individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity,” and further claiming that “[a]s 
a matter of human dignity, every person is equally entitled to flourish”).  
 47. See Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 (“Because 
of the equal value of each human being, property laws should promote the ability of each person to 
obtain the material resources necessary for full social and political participation.”); see also 
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 771–72 (arguing that “[w]e must protect 
important values like fairness . . . even as we recognize that community membership involves the 
possibility of unreciprocated sacrifices”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 880 (noting that “[i]n contrast” 
to utilitarian property theories, “the plural values recognized by the virtue theory of land pushes its 
commitment to redistribution in more complex and expansive directions”).  
 48. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 39, at 211–12 (arguing that although”[l]and law and human 
rights have never seemed particularly natural bedfellows,” property law should more openly 
confront the wide range of value judgments it currently “silently betrays” regarding “the ‘proper’ 
entitlements of human and other actors”).  
 49. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 22, at 1060–61 (suggesting that the regulations governing 
home mortgage loans should be reformed to prevent various sales tactics and to discourage financial 
institutions from making loans to certain borrowers).  
 50. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 805 (outlining the ways 
in which “[a] human flourishing-focused social-obligation theorist might attempt to justify the 
expansion of public access to privately-owned beaches”).  
 51. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that rent control and eviction-
protection statutes may be an example of attempts by the law to protect crucially important dignitary 
interests representative of the flourishing-centered approach to property law he endorses).  
 52. See infra Part III.B. 
 53. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 748 n.8 (noting that he 
uses the terms “law and economics” and “the law-and-economics tradition” as umbrella terms “to 
embrace all normative positions that evaluate alternative possible legal regimes” by referring to 
“wealth” or other cognate scalar metrics).  
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law.54 At the same time, however, they also tend to argue that the law-
and-economics approach should be replaced by, or at least supplemented 
with, a new theoretical system that takes into account the true 
communitarian nature of property and the other important values that 
property law should reflect.55 
Still, it would be inaccurate to claim that recent progressive-property 
accounts have rejected the law-and-economics approach wholesale.56 
Rather, what many recent progressive accounts criticize in the law-and-
economics approach is the single-minded focus on market values as well 
as the tendency to give arguably unsupported, normative weight to 
economic analysis and economic models.57 In place of a single-minded 
focus on efficiency and market values, the recent progressive-property 
accounts tend to seek a new approach that retains a place in property 
theory for such law-and-economics analysis—albeit a place that is properly 
cabined and that serves the plural norms they have identified as the 
proper foundation for a theoretical analysis of property law.58 
 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 745 (stating, as an overarching goal of his article, the desire “to provide in 
property legal theory an alternative to law-and-economics theory, the dominant mode of theorizing 
about property in contemporary scholarship”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 822 (noting that [“[l]aw 
and economics dominates contemporary legal academic discussions of the ownership and use of 
land.”) 
 55. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 819 (arguing that 
“[t]he time has come . . . . [to] end the virtual hegemony of law-and-economics analysis in property 
theory,” which fails to “provide a satisfactory account of many of the obligations that courts have 
imposed on property owners” and which is based upon a “moral dimension [that] is too anemic to 
do justice to the values that inhere in [property] obligations, values that notably include human 
flourishing”); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 201 (arguing that “the market is no simple tool 
to use to achieve healthy lands and communities,” which “can come only from public policies that 
have as their aim not the promotion of markets but something far different”); Singer, supra note 22, 
at 1053 (arguing that “[a]lthough economic analysis of property rights appears to be the dominant 
approach in law schools these days, the utilitarian moral theory on which it is based is . . . fatally 
flawed—at least unless it is supplemented or cabined by normative analyses of other kinds, such as 
considerations of justice, fairness, obligations, and ethics”). 
 56. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823 (“I aim not to discredit . . . [law-and-economics] 
analysis across the board, but merely to explore several problems raised for the operation of law 
and economics within the discrete area of land-use scholarship.”). 
 57. See id. at 823–24 (noting that the particular focus of his progressive-property account is 
“first, on some legal economists’ over-reliance on land’s market value and owners’ incentives to 
maximize market returns in crafting their positive models of landowner behavior, and, second, on 
highlighting what I see as the limited normative significance of economists’ positive findings”).  
 58. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 187 (claiming that “[t]he market train, in truth, is 
less new and less powerful than its advocates claim,” and that it “needs a human engineer . . . able 
to think clearly and talk sensibly about where the train ought to head,” but that under these terms, 
market analysis “can be a potent tool . . . if it is well embedded in a communal order and in a sound 
ethical and ecological view of the human place in nature”); see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 823 
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Indeed, some recent progressive accounts conclude that 
sophisticated forms of economic analysis, especially those incorporating 
behavioral and psychological insights, may play a significant role within a 
progressive framework.59 The real targets of these recent progressive 
accounts are those law-and-economics analyses of property that employ 
straightforward, rational-actor models of landowner behavior as 
determined, in large part, by basic economic incentives and an assumed 
desire to maximize market returns.60 The prospect of preserving a place 
for efficiency-based analysis while serving norms and values unique to 
property law provides much of the appeal and promise of the recent 
progressive-property accounts: these accounts suggest the possibility of a 
useful synthesis between the law-and-economics approach and many 
norms and values that have often been defined as incompatible with it.61 
To date, however, this promise has not been entirely fulfilled because the 
proper role and scope of efficiency analysis within the new progressive-
property approach remains somewhat ambiguous.62 To begin resolving 
 
(“My goal . . . is twofold. First, I aim to explore some of the limitations of law-and-economics 
analysis of land-use questions. Second, I begin to lay the groundwork for an approach rooted in the 
Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, one that is able to incorporate the insights of economic 
analysis without succumbing to the tendency to treat efficiency as the only relevant normative 
consideration.”).  
 59. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 824, 873 (noting that the “exploration of the 
descriptive and prescriptive problems with the economic property theories I am discussing” does 
not “reach these more sophisticated behavioral approaches,” and claiming that “sophisticated and 
empirically grounded positive economic analysis (as well as empirical analysis from within other 
social science disciplines) will have a great deal of value” within a progressive-property framework). 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 824 (“I intend to focus my descriptive critique on the subset of ‘law and 
economics’ accounts of land ownership that continue to employ a rational-actor model of landowner 
behavior.”). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 863 (claiming that “[t]he challenge for property and land-use theorists is 
to find a way to put the valuable tools of economic analysis to use while restricting the normative 
ambition of those tools to their proper domain”).  
 62. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.B. The ambiguity of the proper place for efficiency 
analysis within the larger framework of progressive-property theory is due in part simply to the 
novelty of the recent progressive-property accounts, and the resolution of this ambiguity is one of 
the ends of this Article. At the same time, a measure of ambiguity regarding the role of law-and-
economics analysis is simply an irreducible feature of the new progressive property, marked as it is 
by a plurality of values and a rejection of narrow scalar analysis. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 751 (noting that the progressive approach he advocates “candidly 
admits that the best we can do is to . . . frankly eschew[] any pretense of precise ex ante 
predictions”); see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 887 (noting that his virtue ethics-based account’s 
“plural conception of value raises the obvious question of what to do when two or more values 
appear to conflict,” and that while “[l]egal economists . . . resolve these apparent conflicts” by 
reduction “to a single metric of preference satisfaction” followed by “cost-benefit analysis” on that 
metric, the approach he advocates “does not aim at generating an ‘algorithm for life independent of 
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this ambiguity, I suggest that even the most basic tools from a law-and-
economics analysis of property—those which assume that landowners will 
attempt to maximize the present market value of their land and which 
examine the economic incentives that such landowners then face63—have 
important roles to play within a progressive-property framework.64 
D. The Role of Virtue Ethics Within the New Progressive Property 
Recent progressive accounts advance a plurality of diverse and 
underexamined values, such as human dignity and development, an 
equitable distribution of resources, and other traditionally under-
examined values, as a new guide for property law and theory.65 At the 
same time, they also offer a remarkably consistent, overall normative 
framework to organize and interpret these diverse values.66 In place of 
an exclusive focus on maximizing economic efficiency or preserving the 
negative freedom of landowners, most of the recent progressive-property 
 
judgment’”) (quoting ROASALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 54 (1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). While the inherent ambiguity of the role of law-and-economics tools within a 
progressive-property framework may never be entirely resolved, I argue that it can and should be 
minimized if the basic tools of law-and-economics analysis are incorporated within a larger 
progressive-property framework, along the lines argued for below. See infra Part IV.B. 
 63. For a paradigmatic example, see, for example, Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354–58 (1967). For a criticism of the so-called 
“Demsetzian” position from a recent progressive-property account, see, for example, Peñalver, 
supra note 7, at 825–26 (labeling “discussions of the incentives that land’s market value generates 
for wealth-maximizing landowners” the “Demsetzian” or “investment model of landowner 
behavior”) (quoting Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, 
Investments and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006)). Recent progressive-
property accounts criticize both the “descriptive” aspect of the Demsetzian model, which asserts 
that private owners predictably act in ways that maximize market returns from their land, and its 
“normative” dimension, which concludes that the decision making of private owners is superior to 
the product of public deliberation. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 824–26 (“I intend to focus 
my descriptive critique on the subset of ‘law and economics’ accounts . . . that continue to employ a 
rational-actor model of landowner behavior.”). Below I argue that the basic tools and assumptions 
of the descriptive component of this Demsetzian approach have a role to play even within a 
progressive-property framework. See infra Part IV.B. I make no claims regarding its normative 
dimension.  
 64. I do not deny that more sophisticated tools from behavioral law-and-economics analysis 
have significant, perhaps even more important, roles to play within a progressive-property 
framework than the “basic” descriptive approach considered here. I argue only that basic law-and-
economics tools also have an important role to play within a progressive-property framework. See 
supra note 64 and infra Part IV.B. 
 65. See supra notes 46–48. 
 66. See, e.g., Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, supra note 5, at 818 (claiming that 
“property law is not solely about either individual freedom or cost-minimization” but “also about 
human flourishing and supporting the communities that enable us to live well-lived lives”). 
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accounts consistently suggest that property law should be reoriented 
toward normative systems based on human flourishing67 to fully account 
for the diverse values that property ought to embody. 
In place of welfare-maximizing approaches to property, many 
progressive accounts suggest a new theoretical approach, aimed at 
promoting human flourishing, and based on Aristotelian systems of 
virtue ethics, with three specific goals.68 First, property law properly 
subordinated to a system of virtue ethics can provide a set of rules and 
obligations that protect relatively disadvantaged members of society, 
whose ability to flourish might be harmed by property owners’ immoral 
decisions.69 Second, property law can provide a set of rules and 
obligations that constrain and correct the behavior of nonvirtuous 
property owners so that, over time, they learn to act virtuously of their 
own accord.70 Third, property law can provide a set of rules that clarify 
social obligations and coordinate collective virtuous actions, both for 
individual self-realization and for the broader health of the community.71 
In Part III of this Article, I examine all four common traits of the new 
progressive-property approach in more detail, including this 
incorporation of systems of virtue ethics, to determine whether the 
federal Section 8 housing voucher program and rent control meet the 
new progressive-property approach’s descriptive characteristics. 
 
 67. See, e.g., id. at 761 (noting that “[a]t the core of the Aristotelian tradition is the belief 
that a distinctively human life exists toward which all of one’s capabilities should be directed,” and 
arguing that property law should encourage actions and dispositions that contribute to living this 
distinctively human life); see also FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 207–08 (citing previous work by 
Joseph William Singer, and arguing that “[p]rivate property promotes individual good to the degree 
that it enables individuals to thrive . . . [and] live a ‘fully human life’”); Alexander et al., A Statement 
of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743 (claiming that “[v]alues promoted by property include 
life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge and 
make choices, and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms”). 
 68. E.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 871–72; see also Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm, 
supra note 5, at 761–62 & nn. 64–67 (invoking Aristotelian systems of virtue ethics as a 
normatively distinctive component of the approach to property for which he argues); Lametti, supra 
note 35, at 13, 36–37 (concluding that “[v]irtue should dictate how we act with respect to valuable 
resources,” and considering potential sources for the necessary system of virtue ethics necessary for 
a full understanding of property). Under a progressive-property approach, whether all or any of 
these goals should be pursued is a prudential and context-dependent issue, as are the relative 
weights that should be assigned to each.  
 69. Peñalver, supra note 7, at 871. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 872. Peñalver suggests that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one example 
of such a virtue-based property regime. Despite initial criticism, Title II has largely succeeded in 
reshaping individual and community attitudes while protecting disadvantaged members of society 
from discrimination by non-virtuous individual property owners. Id. at 871–72.  
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III. SECTION 8 AND RENT CONTROL AS EXAMPLES OF THE NEW 
PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY 
Viewed together, the various accounts characterized here and 
elsewhere as the new progressive property comprise a broad and diverse 
doctrine. Indeed, some have argued that the wide range of values 
endorsed by recent progressive-property accounts undermines their 
practical significance.72 At the same time, however, this diversity is a 
fundamental characteristic of these new progressive-property accounts, 
based on the claim that property implicates plural and incommensurable 
values.73 The plural values endorsed by recent progressive-property 
accounts make their boundaries somewhat unclear, and commentators 
have already begun to try to determine whether a particular property 
regime should be considered “progressive property.”74 
In this Part, despite the inherent ambiguities involved in defining the 
borders of accounts consciously built around plural values, I argue that 
both the federal Section 8 housing voucher program and many local rent-
control ordinances merit consideration as potential examples of the new 
progressive property. Rent control has previously been identified as a 
practical example of the values and ends endorsed by the new 
progressive property,75 and I examine this identification in more detail 
below. I also argue that Section 8 is a good example of a progressive-
property approach in practice. More specifically, as I conclude below, 
Section 8 fits the values and ends of the new progressive-property 
approach better than rent control, even though Section 8, unlike rent 
control, has not previously been identified as a practical example of the 
new progressive-property approach.76 
 
 72. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 960 (“It is hard to be against human flourishing, and a 
concept that is in one form or another central to Aristotle, Aquinas, Catholic social thought, modern 
virtue ethics, some forms of natural law, and the capabilities approach . . . but one can question the 
degree of consensus required for implementation in a legal regime.”). 
 73. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743. 
 74. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 5, at 69–71 (suggesting that some community land trusts 
provide a way to practically realize the values and ends advanced by these accounts).  
 75. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that local rent and eviction 
control ordinances may be an example of property law’s attempts to protect crucially important 
dignitary interests and long-standing bonds that land users form with land, which are representative 
of the flourishing-centered approach to property law he endorses). 
 76. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.B. 
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A. Section 8 as an Example of the New Progressive Property 
Since the Great Depression, the federal government has advanced an 
enormous number of federal programs designed to improve housing for 
low-income Americans, each of which has typically undergone several 
changes in substance and title.77 What this Article refers to for the sake 
of simplicity as the federal Section 8 housing voucher program is no 
exception. In using the term “federal Section 8 housing voucher 
program,” this Article refers to the broad program of federal tenant-
based assistance for low-income households to obtain rental housing in 
the private housing market; this program began in earnest in 1974, when 
Congress amended the Housing Act of 1937 by passing the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974.78 
Even a relatively brief description of the Section 8 housing voucher 
program must include a bit of context about some of the other types of 
federal housing assistance from which Section 8 sprung, beginning with 
the creation of the first substantial federal housing programs in the 
Housing Act of 1937.79 Under the public housing program created by the 
Housing Act of 1937, government funds were used to create public, 
government-owned housing for low-income households.80 Federal funds 
were used for the initial-development costs of the public-housing 
facilities, while local funds and local public-housing authorities, or 
“PHAs,” paid for and supervised the facilities’ subsequent 
 
 77. E.g., Edgar O. Olsen, Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, in MEANS-TESTED 
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 365 (Robert A. Moffitt, ed., 2003). 
 78. See Public L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 662 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006)) (adding 
Section 8 to the Housing Act of 1937 for the purpose of “aiding low-income families in obtaining a 
decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing”). For a brief discussion of the 
relationship between Section 8 and predecessor programs, such as the Experimental Housing 
Allowance Program, see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM 
GUIDEBOOK, at 1-2 to 1-3 (2001), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC _35611.pdf/; EDWARD L. 
GLAESER & JOSEPH GYOURKO, RETHINKING FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY: HOW TO MAKE HOUSING 
PLENTIFUL AND AFFORDABLE 115 (2008). Today, what this Article refers to as “the federal Section 8 
housing voucher program,” or simply “Section 8,” is known as the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program. For a discussion of the evolution from the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, also 
known as the rental-certificate program, to the Housing Choice Voucher Program, see DEP’T OF 
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra, at 1-2 to 1-5. As noted in the text, this Article refers generically to 
both the rental-certificate program and the rental-voucher program as “the federal Section 8 housing 
voucher program” or “Section 8.”  
 79. E.g., DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1.  
 80. E.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 370. 
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administration.81 In keeping with the Depression-era roots of the 
Housing Act of 1937, the public housing program focused on job 
creation through the production of new housing projects as well as on 
slum clearance and improving housing conditions for low-income 
families;82 indeed, some scholars have suggested that this goal of job 
creation was so central to these first public housing efforts as to be 
necessary for their passage.83 Beginning in the late 1960s, the federal 
government began to increase its role in the administration of public-
housing projects, by providing additional subsidies to local housing 
authorities in exchange for restrictions on the rents that could be charged 
to low-income tenants and modernization of the housing units.84 Despite 
this expansion, public-housing projects, like all subsequent forms of 
federal, low-income housing programs discussed in this section, do not 
provide an entitlement to decent housing, with many qualified 
households on waiting lists for public housing.85 
In addition to the publicly owned, low-income housing projects that 
began with the Housing Act of 1937, the federal government began 
contracting with private parties to provide low-income housing in 
 
 81. Id.; see DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1 (noting that “[t]he U.S. 
Housing Act of 1937 authorized local PHAs established by individual states. The 1937 Act also 
initiated the public housing program”).  
 82. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-1; see also J. Peter Byrne & Michael 
Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 527, 532–33 (2007) (noting that the Public Housing Act of 1937 “was bitterly opposed by 
the private real estate industry and prevailed in no small part because it provided construction work 
during the Depression”).  
 83. See, e.g., ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (2d ed. 
2010) (suggesting that passage of the Public Housing Act in 1937 “owed nearly as much to public 
housing’s potential for employment generation and slum clearance as to its ability to meet the 
nation’s need for low-cost housing”). 
 84. E.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 370. 
 85. This, of course, makes low-income housing programs something of an outlier among 
means-tested transfer programs. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 77, at 365 (“Unlike other major means-
tested transfers, no low-income housing program is an entitlement for any type of household.”). For 
criticism of this aspect of low-income housing programs, see, for example, SCHWARTZ, supra note 
83, at 318 (arguing that “[u]nfortunately, unless housing assistance for low-income families becomes 
an entitlement—just as tax benefits are for homeowners—the nation’s housing problems will 
persist”). With respect to Section 8, for which demand for assistance generally outstrips the supply 
determined by present funding levels, this means that in most places there are lengthy waitlists of 
otherwise-qualified tenants who are not served by the program. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 
605. For example, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”), which administers 
Section 8 vouchers to over 45,000 households, has a waitlist of several thousand households. 
HOUS. AUTH. OF THE CITY OF L.A., FACT SHEET 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.hacla.org/ 
attachments/wysiwyg/10/FactSheet_2009_091809.pdf . 
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1954.86 These privately owned and federally subsidized projects for low-
income housing can be understood as a separate category of federal 
programs to address problems related to low-income housing.87 In 
general, under the terms of most of these programs, and in exchange for 
federal subsidies, private developers agree to build or rehabilitate 
housing to conform to federal standards. The private developers then 
agree to provide this new or rehabilitated housing primarily or 
exclusively to households that meet certain income characteristics for a 
specified term of years.88 Today, privately owned, subsidized-housing 
projects have become a larger source of new housing aid than publicly 
owned projects.89 
Until the creation of the federal Section 8 housing voucher 
program’s forerunners in the mid-1960s, almost all federal programs for 
low-income housing were “project based,” whether those projects were 
publicly or privately owned.90 Section 8 and its forerunners, therefore, 
represent a third and different type of low-income housing program—one 
tied to specific qualifying households or tenants rather than specific 
housing projects.91 In other words, and in contrast to the project-based 
 
 86. Olsen, supra note 77, at 371–72. The federal government’s efforts to directly contract 
with private parties to provide housing for low-income households began with HUD’s Section 
221(d)(3) Market Interest Rate Program. Id. 
 87. JOHN C. WEICHER, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 3 (1997) (describing “the three 
major categories of subsidized housing programs: public housing, privately owned projects, and 
vouchers and certificates for use in privately owned housing”). 
 88. Olsen, supra note 77, at 371. Today, the largest program of federally subsidized and 
privately owned housing projects for low-income households is the Section 8 New 
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program, which was created in 1974 along with the Section 
8 housing voucher program that is analyzed in this Article. Id. at 372–73. In addition to the 
subsidies for the construction or rehabilitation of privately owned low-income housing projects it 
provides, under the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program, as under the 
Section 8 housing voucher program, federal funds are used to provide rental assistance payments 
that reduce the rents paid by tenants in the subsidized building to a portion of the tenants’ adjusted 
incomes. Id. Despite this similarity, all references to “Section 8” in the remainder of the Article, 
unless otherwise specified, are to the tenant-based Section 8 housing voucher program, and not to 
the project-based subsidies of the Section 8 New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program.  
 89. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983, 990 (2010) (noting that the various private-owner, and project-based federal 
subsidy programs, rather than public housing projects, are now the major source of new project-
based federal aid). 
 90. Olsen, supra note 77, at 374–75. However, tenant-based programs similar in nature to 
the Section 8 housing voucher program had been proposed in legislative debates reaching back to 
the Public Housing Act of 1937. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177 (noting general 
backdrop of early attempts to establish housing voucher programs prior to the 1970s).  
 91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177; see also WEICHER, supra note 87, at 5 (noting that 
“[h]ousing certificates and vouchers are the third type of subsidy program, with a basic subsidy 
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programs, Section 8 is a “tenant-based” program: it provides federal 
subsidies made available through local PHAs for tenants’ use on the 
private-housing market, wherever those tenants may choose to live. 
More specifically, under the Section 8 program, local PHAs set 
payment standards at fixed levels, targeted around local Fair Market Rent 
levels, or “FMRs.”92 Total tenant payment levels for qualifying low-
income households are set according to a formula that accounts for 
various local standards and tenant income, with tenants generally 
responsible for a portion of the rent out of their own adjusted net 
income.93 Tenants are also responsible for finding an apartment that 
meets the rent and physical standards of the program and is owned by a 
landlord willing to participate.94 Landlords may apply for rent increases 
on units inhabited by tenants in the program, with desired rent increases 
approved or denied by local PHAs on the basis of a reasonableness 
test.95 Unlike project-based programs, the Section 8 housing voucher 
program is not designed to increase the supply of affordable housing—
instead, the program relies on low-income households finding acceptable 
units from existing housing stock.96 
In further contrast to project-based federal housing programs, low-
income tenants participating in the Section 8 housing voucher program 
are not tied to a particular place, which means assisted tenants can 
theoretically be dispersed throughout the community—or at least 
dispersed at rates greater than under project-based programs.97 
Moreover, in theory, if not always in practice, the vouchers under this 
 
mechanism very different from the project-based subsidies described above”). 
 92. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-6. 
 93. Id. (noting that total tenant payments under the program are “the greater of: 30% of 
adjusted income, 10% of gross income, the welfare rent (in as-paid states only), or the PHA 
minimum rent. If the family chooses a unit with a gross rent that exceeds the payment standard, the 
family pays the TTP plus the amount by which the gross rent exceeds the payment standard.”). Total 
tenant payments are capped at a portion of the total rent generally not in excess of 40% of the total. 
Id.  
 94. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 177–78 (noting that “[t]o qualify for the voucher 
program, a unit must meet certain standards for physical quality and space,” must be available for 
the Fair Market Rent covered by the vouchers available and the low-income tenant’s qualifying 
income, and must be owned by a landlord who agrees “to physical inspections, to complete the 
necessary paperwork, and to accept rental subsidy payments from the government”). 
 95. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-6. 
 96. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 605. 
 97. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-3 (noting that the Section 8 housing 
voucher program’s popularity is based in part on its role in “dispers[ing] families throughout the 
community and [avoiding] projects or site selection problems”). 
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program are portable; this means that once in the program, assisted 
tenants can move to new residences, provided they can find a new and 
willing landlord and a rental unit that meets the program’s specifications. 
Despite the decades-long head start enjoyed by the earliest public 
housing projects after the Housing Act of 1937,98 today, the housing 
choice voucher program is the largest assisted-housing program 
administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”).99 Many commentators ascribe the voucher 
program’s creation and rapid rise to disappointment with the other types 
of federal housing programs created earlier in the last century.100 
Should the federal Section 8 housing voucher program be considered 
an example of the new progressive property? In general, and especially 
when compared to other types of federal housing programs, the answer 
seems to be at least a qualified yes. The broad statutory purposes of 
Section 8 are to “aid[] low-income families in obtaining a decent place to 
live and . . . promot[e] economically mixed housing.”101 These broad 
statutory purposes match up well with the ends described and endorsed 
by recent progressive-property accounts. Most obviously, the stated goal 
of helping low-income families obtain a decent place to live resonates 
strongly with a progressive-property focus on human flourishing; after 
all, physical security and the means to live on one’s own terms are the 
most basic and essential goods protected by property that promote 
human flourishing.102 Moreover, in attempting to secure this most basic 
property good for low-income households, Section 8 embodies the new 
progressive property’s characteristic concerns for distributive justice, the 
 
 98. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 180 (noting that “[w]hereas the number of 
households in public housing and other project-based subsidy programs has decreased since the 
early 1990s, the voucher program has continued to grow, if only in fits and starts”). 
 99. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 2-1; see also GLAESER & GYOURKO, 
supra note 78, at 103–04 (summarizing HUD data on the number of low-income households 
assisted under various federal programs).  
 100. E.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 115.  
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006). 
 102. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 207–08 (arguing that “[p]rivate property promotes 
individual good to the degree that it enables individuals to thrive . . . [and] live a ‘fully human life’”); 
Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 743 (claiming that the proper 
“[v]alues promoted by property include life and human flourishing, the protection of physical 
security . . . and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms”); Peñalver, supra note 7, at 880 
(pointing out that “a person cannot flourish without the ability to occupy some physical space within 
which she can carry out activities essential to her existence, such as eating and sleeping”); see also 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I.3.1253b23-26 (“Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring 
property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at 
all, unless he be provided with necessaries.”). 
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equitable distribution of resources, and the protection of relatively 
disadvantaged members of society.103 In terms of its general purposes, 
therefore, Section 8 is an excellent example of the kind of property 
program or regime that the new progressive-property approach endorses, 
even though it has not previously been so identified by recent 
progressive-property accounts. 
The close fit between Section 8 and recent progressive-property 
accounts becomes even more evident when Section 8 is scrutinized in 
more detail and compared to other low-income housing programs at a 
similar level of scrutiny. For example, Section 8 focuses on providing 
rental housing to low-income families from existing stock.104 Thus, 
unlike project-based, low-income housing efforts,105 Section 8 is not 
designed to stimulate job growth by building new housing units, a goal 
which is at best ancillary106 to the progressive end of providing low-
income families with decent housing.107 
Moreover, in requiring assisted low-income families to find their own 
housing on the rental market after empowering them with vouchers, 
Section 8 is designed to enhance the dignity and autonomy of its 
recipients,108 while reducing any social stigma that may attach to visible 
 
 103. See supra notes 47, 69, 71 and accompanying text; see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 
880 (claiming that securing basic shelter for the relatively disadvantaged is a key example of the new 
progressive property’s commitment “to redistribution in more complex and equitable directions” to 
promote human flourishing).  
 104. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 605 (noting that the Section 8 housing 
voucher program “is not designed to increase the supply of affordable housing, relying on the 
voucher recipient finding an acceptable unit from among the existing stock”).  
 105. For the roots of federal project-based housing programs in Depression-era theories about 
building subsidies and job creation, see supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 113 (concluding from various studies 
that subsidized housing production through project-based aid actually crowds out private 
development at an average net rate of 50%).  
 107. It might be possible, of course, to argue that the building subsidies inherent in project-
based housing programs also foster progressive-property ends, but the relationship is attenuated at 
best, far more so than the connection between Section 8 and the new progressive property. 
Moreover, the potential relationship between subsidies for project-based construction and the new 
progressive property is further compromised by the environmental and resource demands of such 
construction, which fit poorly with the focus of many recent progressive accounts on environmental 
and resource conservation. See, e.g., FREYFOGLE, supra note 32, at 223 (claiming that property law 
needs to change to meet three critical goals, the first of which must be to promote conservation).  
 108. See, e.g., Written Testimony of Shaun Donovan, Secretary of U.S. Department of 
Housing and Development, before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May 
5, 2011, at 10 (noting HUD’s priorities and “core belief: when you choose a home—you also choose 
transportation to work, schools for your children, and public safety. You choose a community—and 
the amenities available in that community”). Testimonials abound regarding the Section 8 housing 
 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1134 
project-based assistance.109 These goals, of course, are central to many 
recent progressive-property accounts.110 In contrast to Section 8, project-
based programs, by their very definition, do not empower low-income 
households to participate in the rental housing market, and they do not 
therefore advance the dignity or autonomy of their recipients as fully as 
does Section 8.  
Furthermore, the assistance given to low-income households through 
the Section 8 program is narrowly targeted: rather than a pure cash 
transfer to low-income households, which might be used to purchase a 
variety of goods, Section 8 assistance can be used only to participate in 
the housing market. By insisting upon the importance of one specific end 
among the many material needs facing low-income households—namely, 
the need for some minimum degree of adequate housing—Section 8 seeks 
to advance the new progressive property’s commitment to one of the 
essential and incommensurable components of human flourishing.111 
Finally, Section 8 seeks to promote economically mixed housing,112 and 
 
voucher program’s efficacy in promoting the dignity and autonomy of voucher recipients. See, e.g., 
Statement of Terri Ceaser, Testimony before House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., June 10, 2003, at 28 (“When . . . I was issued a housing voucher, I was able 
to move my children to a decent and affordable home in a safe neighborhood. . . . Not only are my 
children busy with their studies, but I . . . will complete graduate school in December 2004. . . . The 
voucher has assured my family of the stability needed for my children to succeed in school . . . . 
Section 8 has afforded me the opportunity to provide my family with a stable and safe environment, 
so I consider this a hand up, not a hand out.”); Statement of Telissa Dowling, Testimony before 
House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity, Comm. on Fin. Servs., June 10, 2003, at 29–
30 (“Without a voucher I would not have been able to get my degree. I might not have a job, and 
my daughter and I would still be homeless.”); Statement of Leona Thompson, Testimony before 
House Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty Opportunity, Comm. on Fin. Servs., July 1, 2003, at 135 (“I 
owe a great deal of thanks and appreciation to the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles 
Section 8 program . . . for providing the resources and information . . . and self-empowerment to 
rise above the elements that keep so many people in economic bondage. . . . I received a certificate 
in medical assisting, a certificate in nurse assisting. . . . [and] I’ve secured enrollment for my sons to 
attend college preparatory schools.”).  
 109. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 78, at 1-3 (noting that the early rise 
of the Section 8 voucher program, and its relative popularity with both low-income families, local 
governments, and federal legislators was due in part to its ability to provide assistance quickly, to 
provide low-income families with a measure of choice, and to provide low-income families with a 
measure of anonymity).  
 110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 
(discussing the need to protect certain crucially important dignitary interests in property law).  
 111. I am grateful to Eduardo Peñalver for this point. See E-mail from Eduardo Peñalver to 
Zachary Bray (Dec. 7, 2011) (on file with author).  
 112. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006); see also DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 
78, at 1-3 (noting that the early rise of the Section 8 voucher program, and its relative popularity 
with low-income families, local governments, and federal legislators was due in part to its ability to 
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it achieves greater integration,113 a goal clearly in line with the 
communitarian focus of recent progressive-property accounts.114 
In sum, Section 8 is a good example of the new progressive property, 
even though it has not previously been so identified. Section 8 fits well 
with many of the values described and prescribed in recent progressive-
property accounts; indeed, it serves these ends at least as effectively as 
every other federal low-income housing program.115 It also serves these 
 
allow low-income families to disperse throughout the larger community).  
However, the integration of Section 8–assisted households into more affluent neighborhoods is not 
always harmonious, especially when it occurs relatively rapidly, as some recent stories have 
indicated. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina, Seeking a Better Life, Section 8 Renters Encounter Resistance, 
N.Y. TIMES, August 11, 2011, at A13 (detailing resistance of existing residents of Lancaster, 
California, a town in Los Angeles County, to the recently increased presence of Section 8–assisted 
tenants). Some might argue that the potential for rapid neighborhood change that can be seen from 
such stories potentially undermines the communitarian goals central to recent progressive-property 
accounts; others might see these sorts of stories as little more than typical NIMBY behavior by 
existing residents, which does not override the benefits to the larger community gained from 
increased residential economic integration.  
Regardless, it is important to realize that stories about floods of voucher-assisted households are 
outliers: whether they live in the suburbs or in central cities, the overwhelming majority of voucher 
holders live in neighborhoods with very few other voucher recipients. SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 
204–05 (noting that although vouchers promote economic residential integration, voucher residents 
tend to disperse from one another; neighborhoods with more than 10% of households receiving 
vouchers comprise only 4.3% of central city neighborhoods, and only 1% of suburban 
neighborhoods). In other words, Section 8 promotes economically mixed housing better than 
alternative federal housing programs and with relatively few side effects. 
Moreover, there is reason to believe that Section 8 tends to promote greater integration of 
minorities than alternative federal housing programs. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 190–
95, 205–06 (collecting data and concluding that while minority Section 8 voucher holders do tend 
to reside in minority neighborhoods, when compared to the beneficiaries of alternative federal 
housing programs, minority Section 8 voucher recipients are less likely to live in highly segregated 
neighborhoods). Although this is not an express statutory goal of the Section 8 program, it is clearly 
a side effect in accord with the communitarian focus of recent progressive-property accounts. 
 113. See, e.g., Byrne & Diamond, supra note 82, at 555–56 (noting that despite its limited 
funding and reluctance by some landlords to participate in the program, “there seems little doubt 
that Section 8 has given many recipients a greater opportunity for integration into a more diverse 
society than public housing would have afforded them”); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 188 
(gathering sources and noting that “voucher recipients tend to live in communities that are far more 
typical of all renters than do public housing residents”); Ellickson, supra note 89, at 1010–16 
(expressing skepticism about the magnitude of the benefits of neighborhood economic integration, 
but concluding that the Section 8 voucher program “is the more potent instrument [compared to 
project-based programs] for the affirmative promotion of economic integration”);.  
 114. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.  
 115. Of course, after comparing Section 8 and alternative federal low-income housing 
programs to the central common characteristics of recent progressive-property accounts, one might 
well conclude that Section 8 is a better example of the new progressive-property approach than 
these alternatives. My conclusion here is slightly weaker: I claim only that Section 8 is at least as 
good an example of the new progressive property as alternative federal low-income housing 
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progressive-property ends much more efficiently than other federal low-
income housing programs.116 Accordingly, comparing Section 8 to other 
low-income housing programs suggests a more general point about the 
previously ambiguous nature of overall economic efficiency within a 
progressive-property framework: when comparing a program or property 
regime to alternative programs, if the initial program serves the central 
ends of the new progressive property at least as well as its alternatives 
but with greater efficiency, then from a progressive-property perspective, 
such a program should be more worthy of protection or advancement 
than the related or alternative programs—especially if the two programs 
conflict.117 This general rule incorporates considerations of economic 
efficiency into a progressive-property framework while keeping them 
subordinate to the central values and ends of recent progressive-property 
accounts. Using this general rule, along with the plural norms central to 
recent progressive-property accounts, contemporary rent control can be 
evaluated in its own right and compared with Section 8 from a 
progressive-property perspective. 
B. Rent Control as an Example of the New Progressive Property 
Although Section 8 has never previously been identified as an 
example of the new progressive property, some recent progressive-
property accounts have already picked out local rent-control and eviction-
protection ordinances as examples of the norms and values for which 
 
programs, and is more efficient (or, at least, less inefficient) to boot.  
 116. See GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 115 (“We are sympathetic to the view that 
cash is preferable to in-kind transfers, but if we are going to subsidize the housing of the poor, then 
vouchers are preferable to all the existing alternatives.”); SCHWARTZ, supra note 83, at 206–07 
(noting that rental vouchers are far less expensive per unit [than project-based alternatives], 
“potentially allowing the government to assist more households with the same amount of funding”); 
Ellickson, supra note 89, at 995 (noting that “most housing economists who have addressed the 
issue assert that, as a general matter, portable tenant-based subsidies are markedly more efficient 
and fairer than project-based subsidies”).  
 117. The straightforward logic behind this conclusion is especially clear with respect to 
otherwise progressive housing programs. As discussed above, programs that serve the generally 
progressive goal of providing decent low-income housing are not entitlements in the United States. 
See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Accordingly, using overall efficiency as a tie-breaker 
between otherwise comparably progressive housing programs allows policy makers to provide more 
low-income housing.  
As will be discussed in greater detail below, two or more otherwise progressive-property programs 
may conflict with one another, creating unintended consequences that are antithetical to the to the 
central values and ends of the new progressive-property approach. See infra Part IV. Therefore, the 
general rule of thumb discussed here may have significant impacts on arguments about specific 
property programs with substantial practical impact.  
1109 The New Progressive Property 
 1137 
they advocate. More specifically, some recent progressive-property 
accounts have pointed out that local rent-control and eviction-protection 
ordinances attempt to protect crucially important dignitary interests 
through property law—namely, the longstanding bonds that some land 
users form with land they do not own.118 In addition, some accounts 
have identified the standard defense of rent control, discussed in more 
detail below, as an important precursor to many of the arguments central 
to the new progressive property.119 
Although some recent progressive-property accounts have already 
noted the link between the new progressive property and the standard 
defense for rent control, some brief background about the long and 
somewhat complicated evolution of rent-control is necessary before 
analyzing whether contemporary, local rent-control and eviction-
protection ordinances are a good fit with the ends and values advanced 
by the new progressive property. Though rent control programs are in 
relative decline today,120 rent control has, in the past, been among the 
most significant governmental programs designed to provide affordable 
housing in the United States.121 
The history of rent control programs is arguably older than the 
common law,122 but the history of rent control in this country did not 
begin until the World War I era, when several cities and states adopted 
temporary rent-control or eviction-control measures.123 Although rent 
 
 118. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 7, at 882–83 (suggesting that some property regimes and 
doctrines do recognize the “crucially important dignitary interests” key to a virtue-based normative 
theory of property, and citing rent control and eviction-protection statutes as an example of same).  
 119. See Alexander, Pluralism and Property, supra note 6, at 1017–19, 1032–35 (discussing 
Margaret Radin’s personhood theory of property generally and her arguments regarding the 
normative justifiability of rent control specifically, and concluding that both share important 
characteristics with his social obligation theory of property).  
 120. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that “[t]here are now only four states 
in the United States with rent-controlled cities: California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey”).  
 121. See, e.g., id. at 58 (“Rent control historically has been among the most important 
interventions in housing markets.”).  
 122. See, e.g., John W. Willis, A Short History of Rent Control Laws, 36 CORNELL L.Q . 54, 
59–68 (1950) (detailing history of rent control efforts from Roman law through the 20th Century).  
 123. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Baar, Rent Control in the 1970’s: The Case of the New Jersey 
Tenants’ Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1976) (“Between the years 1920 and 1923, 
several cities and states adopted rent control or eviction control statutes in response to the housing 
crisis created by World War I. They were seen as temporary emergency measures which would have 
been unconstitutional under normal peacetime conditions.”).  
The temporary nature of these original American rent and eviction control restrictions was 
underscored by the Supreme Court, which held that such “regulation[s] [may be] justified only as a 
temporary measure. A limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could 
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and eviction controls are creatures of state and local law today,124 the 
history of rent control in this country has been marked by two significant 
federal interventions. The first occurred with the reintroduction of rent 
controls by the federal government during World War II, as part of the 
federal government’s general price-control program.125 Federal rent 
control was short-lived, essentially ending after wartime price controls 
expired, and the end of wartime federal controls left to state and local 
governments the issue of whether to keep, modify, or abolish rent 
control.126 However, federal rent controls emerged again in the early 
1970s, when President Nixon ordered an initial ninety-day national 
freeze and subsequent limited caps on rents, wages, and prices,127 using 
the power granted to the executive under the Economic Stabilization Act 
of 1970.128 Although this second round of federal rent controls was 
short-lived,129 a second wave of state and local rent controls emerged in 
 
not be upheld as a permanent change.” Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921). By 1929, even 
New York City, the American jurisdiction with perhaps the longest and most extensive experience 
with rent control, had abolished its initial World War I-era rent controls. Baar, supra, at 634. 
 124. See GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that rent control has been 
effectively turned over to state and local governments); Kathryn Lori Partrick, Comment, Rent 
Control: A Practical Guide for Tenant Organizations, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1978) 
(noting the various ways that state and local governments can enact rent control legislation). 
 125. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 58–59. 
 126. See, e.g., id. (noting that once the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 expired after 
World War II, federal rent control on new buildings was eliminated by the Federal Housing and 
Rent Act of 1947, which effectively ended federal involvement in rent control, making rent control 
or its absence a state and local issue). 
 127. See Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971–75) (known as “Phase I,” beginning 
on August 15, 1971, and involving an initial ninety-day freeze on all wages, prices, and rents); Exec. 
Order No. 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971–75) (known as “Phase II,” beginning on December 28, 
1971 and ending January 12, 1973, and involving a subsequent economic stabilization program, 
which permitted landlords to increase rents by a limited amount each year”).  
The limited amount of rent increases landlords were allowed to seek under Phase II was 
complicated and varied across states, municipalities, and even individual units, depending in part on 
the basis of state and local property tax increases, potential increases based on capital 
improvements, lease renewals, and hardship operations, as well as exemptions for small-scale 
landlords. Partrick, supra note 124, at 1186. Accordingly, many units were not subject to Phase II’s 
regulation, and the overall enforcement of the regulations under Phase II, even for units nominally 
subject to the regulations, was relatively lax. Baar, supra note 123, at 639–40. 
 128. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (2006)).  
 129. Phase II was followed by Phase III, initiated by Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 
(1971–75), which called for voluntary restraint regarding rent increases, but state and local rent 
control measures began to be passed at the end of Phase II. See, e.g., Partrick, supra note 124, at 
1186 (noting that “[t]he termination of Phase II controls prompted passage of significant state and 
local rent control measures”).  
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the mid- to late-1970s.130 
Over the course of their history in the United States, rent and 
eviction controls have taken two forms.131 The first type, sometimes 
called “first generation rent controls,”132 involves straightforward caps 
on rents at a level below market rates.133 The second type, sometimes 
called “second generation rent controls,”134 allows rent levels to be set 
more or less freely when tenants first occupy an apartment, but then limit 
subsequent increases as long as the tenant remains.135 Second 
generation rent controls may also contain eviction controls, which limit 
the permissible grounds for eviction and set procedures for local 
enforcement to prevent landlords from circumventing the substantive 
rent-increase restrictions by threatening to evict tenants who refuse to 
pay rent increases.136 For example, the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization 
Ordinance (“LARSO”),137 which is discussed at greater length below, is 
such a second-generation local rent-control ordinance.138 Today, both 
 
 130. See, e.g., Baar, supra note 123, at 640–41 (noting that “[t]he termination of Phase II 
controls on January 12, 1973, resulted in the passage of more state and local rent controls,” and 
collecting examples from Maryland, New Jersey, Maine, Washington D.C., and Alaska). 
 131. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (“There have been two basic types 
of rent control in the United States. One . . . has capped rents at a level far below current market 
rates for those tenants who have lived in their apartments for a long time. Those rent levels would 
not persist if these tenants moved. The other type, often referred to as rent stabilization . . . allows 
landlords and tenants to fix rents more or less freely when the tenants first occupy the apartment, 
but limits increases thereafter.”). 
 132. See, e.g., David Shulman, Real Estate Valuation Under Rent control: The Case of Santa 
Monica, 9 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS’N 38, 39–40 (1981) (discussing background of first 
and second generation rent controls); see also Richard E. Blumberg, Brian Quinn Robbins & 
Kenneth K. Baar, The Emergence of Second Generation Rent Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240 
(1974).  
 133. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59.  
 134. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 132, at 39–40 (1981) (discussing background of first and 
second generation rent controls); see also Blumberg, Robbins, & Baar, The Emergence of Second 
Generation Rent controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240 (1974). 
 135. GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59.  
 136. Partrick, supra note 124, at 1202–03 (claiming that because landlords hold dominant 
bargaining positions when housing is in short supply, and because rent-control restrictions alone 
may be “circumvented by landlords who threaten to evict tenants who refuse to pay rent increases,” 
some rent-control measures “often limit the permissible grounds for eviction and set procedures for 
local enforcement”).  
 137. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15 (1979), available at http://bit.ly/ReEuEn. 
 138. LARSO contains both restrictions on rent, see, for example, chapter 15, section 
151.04(A) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (prohibiting any landlord from “demand[ing], 
accept[ing], or retain[ing] more than the maximum adjusted rent permitted pursuant to this 
chapter”), and limitations on the permissible grounds for eviction, see, for example, chapter 15, 
section 151.09 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code of 1979 (setting forth permissible grounds for 
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forms of rent control are dying out: only a few states contain 
municipalities with either type, and many states ban rent control 
outright.139 
Critics of rent control argue that its popularity is dramatically 
dwindling both because it has failed in its main goal of making housing 
more affordable in high-cost markets, and because its many side effects 
have become more widely acknowledged since the last wave of rent-
control ordinances were enacted in the 1970s.140 The standard 
arguments against rent control are numerous and well developed: critics 
argue that rent control is highly inefficient and distorts housing 
markets;141 is a poorly focused and potentially unfair redistribution 
device;142 exacerbates the very housing shortages it is designed to 
 
eviction limited, for most rental units, to non-payment of rent, violation of the tenancy agreement, 
nuisance or criminal activity, refusal to grant access, renew a lease, unapproved subtenancies, 
renovations, demolition, removal from the rental market, or use of the property by the landlord or a 
family member or a resident manager, or government order).  
LARSO is best understood as a second-generation rent-control ordinance: when the rental unit is 
voluntarily vacated by a tenant, or vacated as a result of a certain permissible evictions, then “[t]he 
landlord may increase the maximum rent. . . to any amount upon re-rental” of the unit. L.A., CAL., 
MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.06(C) (1979). 
 139. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 59 (noting that “[t]oday, thirty-two 
states ban their municipalities from enacting local rent control rules,” and “only four states in the 
United States [contain] rent-controlled cities: California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey”).  
 140. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 741, 770 (1988) (claiming that “the economics profession is united over rent 
control, as it is not over any other issue”); Edgar O. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 931, 940–41 (1991) (claiming that “[t]he shortcomings of rent-control 
ordinances are not limited to their unjustifiable patterns of benefits and costs,” but also because 
they are “highly inefficient redistributive devices” that “lead to higher costs of producing housing 
services in both the controlled and uncontrolled sectors,” as well as to “haphazard changes in 
consumption patterns by occupants of controlled units”); see also Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus 
and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 988, 991 (1984) 
(noting that only 1.9 percent of the economists surveyed disagreed with the proposition that a 
“ceiling on rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing available”). 
 141. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 770 (claiming that “[t]he strength of the [efficiency] 
case [against rent control] is shown by the efforts to circumvent it” because “[t]here is simply no 
effort to show that misallocations associated with rent control do not exist”);Olsen, supra note 140, 
at 944–45 (arguing that “[t]he benefits of a mature rent-control ordinance to tenants is far less than 
its cost to landlords because it leads to distortions in the consumption patterns of tenants and the 
production decisions of landlords” as well as “haphazard changes in consumption patterns”).  
 142. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 140, at 944 (“No compelling justification has been offered for 
financing benefits to tenants by an implicit tax on landlords. There is no satisfactory explanation of 
why the magnitude of this tax on equally wealthy people should depend on the proportion of their 
assets held in . . . rental housing. The pattern of benefits is equally indefensible. . . . In short, rent 
control is a poorly focused redistributive device.”).  
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reduce;143 reduces tenant mobility and increases commuting costs;144 
leads to unnecessarily formalized relationships between landlords and 
tenants, crowding out the possibility for increased social capital;145 
distorts landlords’ incentives to maintain building quality, leading to 
dilapidation;146 and tends to reduce the possibility of cooperation and 
increase the possibility of nasty behavior between landlords and 
tenants.147 Much, though not all, of this criticism obviously comes from 
economists or scholars writing in what progressive-property accounts 
refer to as the law-and-economics approach. 
The leading contemporary argument in defense of rent control has 
many similarities to the new progressive property;148 indeed, some 
recent progressive-property accounts have acknowledged the close links 
between the new progressive property and the ideas behind rent 
control’s standard defense.149 The standard defense of rent control 
admits the potential efficiency losses picked out by many critics of rent 
control, but suggests that these potential losses may be offset by other 
gains of rent control, at least in certain situations.150 More specifically, 
 
 143. Epstein, supra note 140, at 767 (arguing that “[a]ll rent control statutes . . . depress the 
future total return of any investment,” leading to reduced future investments in housing stock, “so 
that rent control statutes only exacerbate the housing shortages they are said to alleviate”). 
 144. Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 948, 
952–53 (1991) (noting that “[a]ll scholars agree that rent control lessens tenant mobility,” which 
“may lock in stale households,” “lock out the fresh entrants the community most needs to retain its 
vitality,” and “increase commuting costs” for both tenants in rent controlled units and others).  
 145. Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the 
Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 326 (2006) (noting that rent control “spawn[s] some of the most 
legalized of midgame relationships between landlords and tenants” who are then “uncommonly 
likely to turn to lawyers and courts to resolve spats”). 
 146. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 60 (noting that rent control “limits 
landlords’ incentive to invest in building quality,” then gathering citations and noting the “abundant 
evidence” on the link between “rent control and quality deterioration”). 
 147. See, e.g., Ellickson, Rent control, supra note 144, at 949 (noting that “[r]ent control . . . 
tends to lock landlords and tenants into continuing uncooperative relationships” and “breeds 
nastiness in landlord-tenant interactions”).  
 148. Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986). The 
pre-eminence of Radin’s defense of rent control can be seen in the prominence of her arguments in 
many of the leading critiques of rent control. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 770–73 (focusing 
solely on Radin’s “communitarian” defense of rent control); see also Olsen, supra note 140, at 934–
35 (noting that Radin’s detailed analysis stands in “stark contrast with the many superficial attempts 
to justify rent control”).  
 149. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 150. Radin, supra note 148, at 352 (suggesting that “the level of efficiency losses” picked out 
by critics of rent control might “be outweighed by other gains” and offering instead a normative 
account of the potential value of rent control “that takes into account the uncertainties and 
complexities of actual practice”). 
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the standard defense of rent control begins by suggesting, as a baseline, 
that most tenants generally ought to have a stronger interest in retaining 
their longstanding homes than most landlords ought to have with respect 
to their freedom of contract or the maintenance of their profit 
margins.151 However, according to the standard defense of rent control, 
this baseline rule does not apply to would-be tenants, because their 
potential property interest in a future tenancy has not yet become bound 
up, in meaningful, noncommercial ways, with their personhood.152 Thus, 
the standard defense suggests that rent and eviction controls may be 
justified, even in the face of some of the negative side effects identified by 
various critics, as long as those controls can be justified in terms of more 
significant benefits related to protecting property interests in personhood 
or existing communities.153 
This reasoning has obvious similarities to recent progressive-
property accounts.154 However, at least one recent progressive-property 
account has argued that progressive-property theory can and should be 
able to provide a more complete evaluation of rent-and-eviction controls 
because the standard personhood defense of rent control, despite its 
express consideration of certain communitarian goals, fails to give 
aggregate well-being its due.155 More specifically, according to recent 
progressive-property accounts, although the standard defense identifies 
important values potentially served by rent and eviction controls, it fails 
to provide the sort of systematic framework for evaluating how much 
loss, and what sorts of negative side effects, should be tolerated to serve 
these values.156 By its own terms, then, the new progressive property 
 
 151. See id. at 359–60 (stating “[t]he intuitive general rule . . . that preservation of one’s 
home . . . [or] noncommercial personal use of an apartment as a home is morally entitled to more 
weight than purely commercial landlording”). 
 152. Id. at 361–62.  
 153. Id. at 371. Radin does not attempt to provide a blanket defense of rent control; arguing 
that in situations where “it does not make sense to speak of property for personhood or of 
community with respect to the tenants involved, then on balance rent control may not be justified, 
especially if most landlords appear noncommercial or efficiency losses are high.” Id. 
 154. See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 20 (2010) (drawing a relationship between Radin’s theory of property as 
personhood and the communitarian, virtue-ethics based theory advanced by Peñalver). 
 155. Peñalver, supra note 7, at 862.  
 156. Id. More specifically, according to Peñalver, although Radin makes “a convincing case” 
for granting tenants some form of rent and eviction control based on the potential value of some 
tenants’ attachments to their long-time homes – a potential value much in keeping with the recent 
progressive-property accounts – her account is ultimately flawed because it “provides no framework 
for assessing how much of an economic sacrifice society ought to tolerate . . . to protect the 
personhood interests of individual tenants.” Id. 
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must be capable of providing a more thorough, systematic, and context-
specific evaluation of both the benefits and the costs of rent and eviction 
controls if it is to provide a new and lasting contribution to this debate. 
What, then, should an evaluation of rent and eviction controls based 
on recent progressive-property accounts look like? The substantive 
similarities between the standard defense of rent control and the new 
progressive property have already been noted.157 To improve upon the 
standard defense of rent control, therefore, an evaluation of rent control 
from the perspective of the new progressive property must begin where 
the standard defense of rent control leaves off: by providing greater 
specificity about when, on balance, rent control may not be justified, 
given its acknowledged negative side effects.158 Because of the 
importance of context to recent progressive-property accounts,159 such 
an evaluation is not possible in the abstract: some general comparison to 
another property program or, if possible, some specific situation 
involving rent control must be analyzed. At the end of this Part, I provide 
such a comparison, analyzing rent control and the federal Section 8 
housing voucher program from a progressive property standpoint. In 
Part IV.B below, rent control’s relative merit or lack thereof from a 
progressive-property perspective will be examined in the context of the 
rent and eviction control ordinances in Los Angeles, their interaction 
with Section 8, and the conflict at the center of this interaction. But 
before turning to the close examination of rent control and Section 8 in 
such a specific situation, it is useful to compare rent control and Section 
8 more generally. 
As discussed above, many of rent control’s acknowledged negative 
side effects arise from its inefficient distortion of economic incentives for 
participants in housing markets.160 However, some of rent control’s 
negative side effects also impact ends that are more central to recent 
progressive-property accounts.161 In light of these substantial negative 
and anti-progressive side effects of rent control,162 Section 8, which 
 
 157. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 153. 
 159. See Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, supra note 4, at 744 (claiming 
that deliberation about property entitlements “should include non-deductive, non-algorithmic 
reflection” that is “both principled and contextual”).  
 160. See supra notes 140–144 and accompanying text.  
 161. See supra notes 142, 144–147 and accompanying text (noting that rent control may 
seem unfair, may breed “nastiness” in landlord and tenant behavior, and may lock the parties into 
prolonged and uncooperative social relationships).  
 162. To be clear, in calling these side effects “negative” or “undesirable,” I mean only that 
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largely lacks such negative and anti-progressive side effects, seems on 
balance to be at least as progressive as rent control.163 At the same time, 
of course, Section 8 does not impose the sorts of inefficient distortions 
that rent control inflicts on housing markets.164 In other words, although 
rent control has previously been identified as an example of the new 
progressive property,165 and although Section 8 has not previously been 
so identified, Section 8 is at least as progressive as rent control. It is also 
more efficient. 
This conclusion has a number of important consequences for both 
low-income housing policy and the larger academic debate. To begin, as 
argued above,166 if a program such as Section 8 serves the central ends 
of the new progressive property at least as well as its alternatives but 
with greater efficiency, then from a progressive-property perspective, one 
should generally seek to protect or advance such a program at the 
expense of the less efficient alternative, especially if the programs 
conflict. Accordingly, if, as I argue in Part IV below, the intersection of 
rent control and Section 8 generates conflict that is deeply antithetical to 
the ends advanced by recent progressive-property accounts, then it will 
be necessary to consider policy solutions that seek to preserve Section 8 
while eliminating or phasing out rent control, even from the standpoint 
of the new progressive property.167 
 
they are antithetical to the central values and ends described in recent progressive-property 
accounts, aside from whatever negative effects they may have according to other approaches to 
property law and theory. Insofar as they are antithetical to the central values and ends described in 
recent progressive-property accounts, they are also “anti-progressive,” and I use the term in this 
sense.  
 163. Of course, after comparing Section 8’s beneficial impact on the dignity and autonomy of 
many low-income tenants with the related anti-progressive social and behavioral side effects of rent 
control, one might well conclude that Section 8 is a better practical example of the values and ends 
endorsed by the new progressive property than rent control. My conclusion here is slightly weaker: 
at this point, I claim only that Section 8 is at least as good an example of the values and ends 
endorsed by the new progressive-property approach as most local rent-control ordinances, and more 
efficient (or, at least, less inefficient) to boot. For an argument on progressive-property grounds that 
that rent control should be eliminated or phased out in most contexts in favor of Section 8, see Part 
IV.B and Part V, infra at notes 216–231 and accompanying text.  
 164. Compare, e.g., note 116 and accompanying text (gathering sources and concluding that 
Section 8 is a more efficient means of low-income housing assistance, or at least less inefficient, than 
existing alternatives), with, for example, notes 140–144 and accompanying text (describing rent 
control’s inefficient distortion of housing markets). 
 165. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.  
 166. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 167. See infra Part IV.B. This means that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is a 
significant practical convergence in this context between the ultimate policy solutions that should be 
prescribed by both the new progressive-property approach and by the law-and-economics approach. 
 
1109 The New Progressive Property 
 1145 
IV. LESSONS FOR THE NEW PROGRESSIVE-PROPERTY APPROACH FROM 
THE INTERSECTION OF RENT CONTROL AND SECTION 8 
Part IV moves beyond the general comparison of rent control and 
the federal Section 8 housing voucher program to look more closely at 
their intersection through the lens of recent litigation. Part IV.A reviews 
this litigation in detail. Part IV.B discusses the significance of this 
litigation and the broader conflict between Section 8 and rent control 
that this litigation illuminates for the new progressive-property approach. 
Part IV.B concludes by suggesting that even from a progressive-property 
perspective, it may be appropriate to phase out or eliminate rent control 
to protect the progressive property ends that Section 8 realizes. 
A. Recent Litigation at the Intersection of Rent Control and Section 8 
Recent litigation arising from the intersection of the federal Section 8 
housing voucher program and local rent and eviction controls offers a 
unique opportunity to test and clarify the new progressive property. In 
particular, this conflict makes it possible to further clarify the ambiguous 
role of some basic law-and-economics tools within the larger progressive-
property framework, by demonstrating additional significant and 
practical roles for these tools that advance, rather than compromise, the 
fundamental norms and goals of progressive property theory. Moreover, 
examining the conflict between Section 8 and local rent and eviction 
controls sheds new and useful light on the new progressive property’s 
communitarian nature. To explore these insights, it will first be necessary 
to look at the litigation that reveals the low-income housing conflict at the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control in more detail. 
This conflict has been most visible in Southern California—more 
specifically in greater Los Angeles—which possesses a rental-housing 
market that is unusually significant and complicated.168 Due to Los 
 
In short, both positions should lead to the conclusion that rent control should be eliminated or 
phased out, for the reasons discussed above from a law-and-economics perspective, see notes 140–
144 and accompanying text, and for the reasons given below from a progressive-property 
perspective, see infra Part IV.B. 
 
 168. The share of Los Angeles residents who rent their homes is double the national rate, 
though roughly equivalent to the rental rate of other major U.S. metropolitan areas, such as New 
York and Chicago. DANIEL FLAMING ET AL., ECONOMIC ROUNDTABLE, ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE 
RENT STABILIZATION ORDINANCE AND THE LOS ANGELES HOUSING MARKET 26, 29 (2009). 
However, Los Angeles renters typically pay a larger share of their income than renters in either New 
York or Chicago, and substantially more than average renters elsewhere in the United States. Id. at 
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Angeles’s size and socioeconomic diversity, the Section 8 housing 
voucher program, administered through Los Angeles-area PHAs, is one 
of the largest in the nation.169 Yet Section 8 is not the only housing-
assistance regime in Los Angeles. Rent control also plays an important 
role, as Los Angeles is also home to one of the most significant, 
remaining, local rent-control ordinances in the United States. The Los 
Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (“LARSO”), enacted in 1979,170 is 
an example of a second-generation rent-control ordinance: it contains 
provisions for limited annual rent increases171 as well as a series of 
eviction restrictions that limit the legal grounds on which landlords may 
evict tenants.172 Within the City of Los Angeles, LARSO covers all rental 
units in buildings with two or more rental units constructed before 
October 1, 1978, with a few additional exceptions and exemptions.173 As 
a result, the number of rental units subject to LARSO has tended to 
decline since 1978, as new units have been constructed and old units 
have passed through LARSO’s various exceptions and exemptions;174 
however, LARSO still covers over 620,000 rental units,175 a total 
equivalent to almost two-thirds of all rental units and about forty percent 
of all housing in Los Angeles.176 Permissible grounds for eviction under 
 
28. From 1970 until 2006, Los Angeles’s population grew 34 % while its housing inventory grew 
only 26%. Id. at 25–26. Much of this scarcity can be attributed to the 1980s, when Los Angeles’s 
population grew 17% but the housing inventory grew only 9%. Id. Los Angeles’s rent-control 
ordinance, discussed in more detail immediately below, was enacted in 1979. 
 169. The Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”), a Los Angeles-area PHA 
that administers the Section 8 housing voucher program in the area, administers the second-largest 
housing voucher program in the United States, with a total of over 45,000 housing vouchers at 
present. See Section 8 Housing, HACLA, http://www.hacla.org/section8/ (last updated Oct. 2012).  
 170. L.A. , CAL, MUN. CODE ch. 15 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/ReEuEn. 
 171. See id. §§ 151.04(A), 151.06(C) (detailing restrictions on annual rent increases for 
existing tenancies and the permissible grounds for maximum rent increases including annual 
adjustments and unrestricted increases during permissible vacancies or evictions).  
 172. See id. § 151.09 (detailing permissible grounds for eviction in registered rent-controlled 
units in Los Angeles).  
 173. Id. § 151.02 (Rental Units) (defining those rental units covered by LARSO). Additional 
exceptions include units taken out of the rental housing market as well as those that have undergone 
“substantial renovation” since 1980, as determined by reference to the cost of the renovation. Id.  
 174. For more detailed information about the distribution of lost rent-controlled units in Los 
Angeles, and the relation of this loss to the construction of new affordable-housing rental units, see 
BETH STECKLER & ADAM GARCIA, AFFORDABILITY MATTERS: A LOOK AT HOUSING CONSTRUCTION 
& AFFORDABILITY IN LOS ANGELES 25–29 (2008), available at http://www.livableplaces.org/files/ 
Affordability+Matters+Final+2.pdf. 
  175. L.A. HOUS. DEP’T, POLICY & PLANNING UNIT, A GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE RENTAL 
HOUSING IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES 4 (2011). 
 176. DANIEL FLAMING ET AL., supra note 168, at 2. 
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LARSO for registered units are limited to nonpayment of rent and a few 
other narrow grounds, including removal from the rental market, 
significant tenant misconduct, or criminal activity.177 LARSO’s rent 
controls and eviction restrictions apply to tenants who are assisted by the 
Section 8 housing voucher program, provided that they live in a rental 
unit that qualifies for LARSO’s protections.178 At the same time, of 
course, tenants can be covered by LARSO’s restrictions on rent 
increases and permissible grounds for eviction even if they do not qualify 
for the Section 8 housing voucher program, again, provided that they live 
in a rental unit that qualifies for LARSO’s protections.179 As a result, 
tens of thousands of low-income tenants in Los Angeles who participate 
in the Section 8 housing voucher program have used their vouchers in 
rent-controlled units, often living alongside unassisted tenants, many of 
whom enjoy the same restrictions on rent increases and permissible 
grounds for eviction imposed by LARSO as their Section 8–assisted 
neighbors. 
During the last decade, California landlords in rent-controlled 
jurisdictions—particularly in greater Los Angeles—began using various 
new types of form eviction notices, marketed by law firms, in a series of 
attempts to evict substantial numbers of tenants who were both receiving 
Section 8 housing-voucher assistance and living in rent-controlled 
units.180 The forms changed over time in response to legal challenges by 
 
 177. See § 151.09 (setting forth permissible grounds for eviction— limited, for most rental 
units, to non-payment of rent, violation of the tenancy agreement, nuisance or criminal activity, 
refusal to grant access, renew a lease, unapproved subtenancies, renovations, demolition, removal 
from the rental market, use of the property by the landlord or a family member or a resident 
manager, or government order).  
 178. See id. § 151.02 (Rental Units) (5) (expressly noting that LARSO’s protections and 
restrictions also apply to “rental units for which rental assistance is paid pursuant to the [Section 8] 
Housing Choice Voucher Program codified at 24 C.F.R. part 982,”); see also Barrientos v. 1801–
1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2009) (commenting on same).  
 179. Indeed, the many exceptions to LARSO’s coverage suggest that objections about the lack 
of fairness and distributional equity often levied against rent control in general may be particularly 
significant in this context. The fact that some relatively affluent tenants qualify for LARSO’s 
protection while some relatively poorer tenants do not is one of the main objections raised by critics 
of this rent-control program. See, e.g., Paul Habibi & Eric Sussman, Op-Ed., L.A. Should Abandon 
Rent Control, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2010 (claiming that it “makes little sense” that under LARSO, a 
“lawyer earning $200,000 a year renting in a pre-1978 building would be afforded the benefits of 
rent control, whereas a struggling retiree living off Social Security, but renting in a post-1978 
building, would not”). In general, a perceived lack of distributional equity is both an anti-progressive 
feature and a common criticism of rent control. See supra notes 47 and 142 and accompanying text.  
 180. For one example of these efforts and the litigation that ensued, see Barrientos, 583 F.3d 
at 1197. Barrientos and the immediately related litigation in California state and federal courts 
provide the most prominent example of litigation arising out of this fundamental conflict, but not 
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some tenants, but the essential substance remained the same, as all of the 
form notices were ostensibly based on federal regulations enacted to 
implement the Section 8 housing voucher program. The federal 
regulations cited in the form notices provide a general baseline of 
standards that apply to landlords and tenants who wish to participate in 
the federal program.181 Among them is the “good cause” eviction 
standard, which provides additional substance to the statutory mandate 
that “during the term of the [assisted tenant’s] lease, the owner shall not 
terminate the tenancy except for serious or repeated violation of the 
terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal, 
State, or local law, or for other good cause.”182 
More specifically, the federal good-cause eviction standard, as fully 
defined in the relevant regulations, provides that “‘other good cause’ . . . 
may include, but is not limited to . . . [a] business or economic reason for 
termination of the tenancy (such as sale of the property, renovation of 
the unit, or desire to lease the unit at a higher rental).”183 Without citing 
any unit-specific facts that might be related to a business opportunity as 
defined by the statute and regulation, and without any other support 
related to specific tenant misconduct or another appropriate good-cause 
eviction ground under federal law or LARSO, the form notices simply 
cited the federal good-cause statute and regulations and stated that the 
landlord intended to terminate the assisted tenancy for a general 
 
the only example, as similar litigation has arisen in other cities with both substantial rent control and 
large populations of Section 8–assisted tenants.  
More specifically, similar issues arose in litigation in New York, in, for example, Rosario v. Diagonal 
Realty, L.L.C., 872 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 2007), in which the right of tenants assisted by the Section 8 
housing voucher program to request renewal of their leases under local rent stabilization ordinances 
was also challenged and affirmed. For a more fulsome discussion of Rosario, and its close 
relationship to Barrientos and other similar state cases in California, see, for example, Erin Liotta, 
United States Agrees that HUD Voucher Regulations Do Not Preempt Local Eviction Controls, 39 
HOUSING L. BULL. 201, 202 n.15 (2009) (noting the similarities between Barrientos and Rosario), 
and Jason Lee, New York’s Highest Court Rules NYC Voucher Owners Must Offer Assisted Renewal 
Leases, 37 HOUSING L. BULL.158 (2007) (summarizing Rosario).  
 181. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982 (2010). 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(C) (2011) (emphasis added).  
 183. 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1)(iv) (2010). Although a business or economic reason may 
constitute good cause for the eventual termination of an assisted tenancy in jurisdictions without 
more searching local eviction controls, the regulations are clear that it does not constitute other 
good cause for termination during the initial lease term, which must last at least a year. See 24 
C.F.R. §§ 982.309(a)(1), 982.310(d)(2) (2010) (stating that the initial lease term for a Section 8–
assisted tenancy must be for at least one year, and that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner 
may not terminate the tenancy for ‘other good cause’ . . . based on . . . a business or economic 
reason”).  
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“business or economic reason,” namely, the general desire “to lease the 
unit at a higher rental rate.”184 This conduct was, at best, in tension with 
LARSO, and it led to the litigation ultimately resolved by the Ninth 
Circuit in Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC.185 
On their collective face, the form notices at issue in Barrientos and 
the related litigation in California state courts obviously sought to evade 
the eviction restrictions imposed by LARSO, as none of the stated 
reasons for the attempted evictions in the form notices met the grounds 
for permissible evictions under LARSO.186 Accordingly, hundreds of 
tenants across Southern California sought to challenge the legality of the 
attempted eviction notices, either by resisting subsequent eviction actions 
brought by the landlords or by filing declaratory judgment actions before 
an eviction action could be brought.187 The landlords typically defended 
the legality of the notices, both in Barrientos and in the related litigation, 
 
 184. See, e.g., Barrientos, 583 F.3d at 1206 (reproducing the relevant section of one 
instantiation of the form notices). More specifically, the notices stated that: 
[t]he grounds for termination of your tenancy are based upon . . . 24 C.F.R. 
982.310(d)[(1)] (iv)], which allows the landlord to terminate the rental agreement for a 
business or economic reason, including but not limited to, the desire to opt-out of the 
Tenant Based Section 8 Program and or the desire to lease the unit at a higher rental 
rate. Prior to the service of this notice, the landlord made a business decision to no 
longer participate in the Section 8 voucher program for your unit. 
Id. (reproducing the relevant excerpts of one form notice). Although the specific phrasing of this 
form notice varies slightly from earlier and subsequent versions of the form notice that were also 
litigated in California courts at around the time of Barrientos, the essential substance is the same, 
and the variations will not be discussed in greater detail in this Article. The essential substance of 
this notice is also, of course, quite similar to the substance of the legal issues litigated in Rosario, in 
which a New York landlord attempted to evict a Section 8–assisted tenant from a rent-controlled 
unit after informing the local housing authority that it “no longer wished to participate in the 
Section 8 program with respect to [the tenant], and refused the [relevant housing authority’s Section 
8] subsidy payments for her apartment.” 872 N.E.2d at 862. 
The notices at issue in Rosario did not frame the issue of whether unspecified business or economic 
reasons constituted other good cause under the federal Section 8 statutes and regulations as clearly 
as the notices in Barrientos. Accordingly, Barrientos presents a much more useful example with 
which to examine and test the potential roles within a progressive-property framework of efficiency 
analysis and basic economic incentives, and for this reason, it is discussed at much greater length 
here. Nevertheless, the preemption questions at issue on the surface of the litigation and, more 
importantly, the fundamental, low-income housing conflict that the litigation illuminates are 
substantially the same.  
 185. 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 186. See L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.09 (2012) (setting forth permissible grounds 
for eviction under LARSO). 
 187. Many of these tenants were represented as part of a coordinated effort that included 
lawyers from the Los Angeles Legal Aid Foundation; Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; and the National 
Housing Law Project. In the interest of disclosure, I was employed by Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP 
while representing many of these tenant-litigants.  
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by arguing that the Section 8 good-cause eviction standards set forth in 
the relevant federal statute and regulations preempted the more stringent 
eviction controls found in LARSO.188 
The potential consequences of the landlords’ attempts to uphold 
these form notices in Barrientos are best illustrated by a brief thought 
experiment. Imagine two long-time neighbors, Sam and Ursula, who rent 
neighboring rent-controlled units subject to LARSO from a common 
landlord, Larry. Sam and Ursula both signed initial one-year leases on 
their rental units several years ago. Since that time, protected by the 
eviction restrictions of LARSO, they have remained in their rental units 
and continued to remit regular rent payments to Larry without signing 
another lease.189 Larry, for his part, has consistently sought and received 
annual upward adjustments to the total rent for both units equal to the 
maximum annual adjustment permitted under LARSO. All in all, Sam 
and Ursula’s tenancies, total rent payments, and rental units are largely 
identical except in one detail: tenant Sam receives Section 8 housing 
voucher assistance, while Ursula’s tenancy is unassisted by any federal 
program.190 
Had the landlords’ argument about the form notices prevailed, then 
landlord Larry would now be able to evict Section 8–assisted Sam with a 
form eviction notice, based solely on Larry’s general business or 
economic desire to raise the rent on Sam’s unit. However, Larry would 
still not be able to evict unassisted tenant Ursula except on one of the 
grounds specifically permitted under LARSO. Such a business or 
economic reason for evicting Section 8–assisted Sam would almost 
always be present because LARSO, like many other second-generation 
rent-control ordinances, places caps on year-to-year rent increases within 
an ongoing tenancy while allowing rent increases without restriction 
during periods of permissible vacancy.191 Indeed, under the landlords’ 
 
 188. More specifically, in Barrientos, the landlords argued that 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1)(iv), 
which specifies that “good cause” under the federal “good cause” standard for Section 8 evictions 
“may include [the] desire to lease the unit at a higher rental,” preempted the relevant provisions of 
LARSO restricting the grounds for permissible evictions from rent-controlled units.  
 189. The factual pattern of each of these hypothetical tenancies is thus similar to the patterns 
at issue in Barrientos and many of the other cases that were litigated. In general, in such rent-
controlled units in Los Angeles, tenants and landlords do not execute additional leases beyond the 
initial one-year period although tenants remain in possession and landlords may seek annual 
adjustments pursuant to LARSO.  
 190. Again, aside from this single difference between Sam and Ursula’s tenancies, assume 
roughly similar lengths of tenancy, roughly equal total rents (once Sam’s voucher payments are 
included), and more or less identical rental units.  
 191. Compare L.A. MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.04(A) (2012) (detailing restrictions on annual 
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interpretation, this business or economic reason is both enabled and 
effectively generated by the intersection of LARSO with Section 8. 
More specifically, Larry’s business or economic reason for evicting 
Section 8–assisted Sam is simply Larry’s pre-existing desire to raise the 
rent on Sam’s unit, during a period of a permissible vacancy, beyond the 
limits of the annual increases permitted for ongoing tenancies under 
LARSO.192 And under the landlords’ interpretation of the regulations, 
this desire becomes possible; therefore, it becomes an intelligible 
business or economic reason, simply because the landlords’ 
interpretation makes an eviction on these grounds permissible, if only for 
Section 8–assisted tenants like Sam. In one swoop, therefore, the 
preemptive relationship between Section 8 and LARSO advanced by the 
landlords would entirely strip away LARSO’s substantive protections 
from Section 8–assisted tenancies and only Section 8–assisted tenancies, 
while also dramatically enhancing the incentives for landlords to evict 
Section 8–assisted tenants.193 
The landlords’ arguments in Barrientos and most of the related cases 
were, however, unsuccessful. Courts have generally found that the federal 
good-cause eviction standards for Section 8 tenancies were intended as a 
floor, setting an absolute minimum baseline to protect tenants 
 
rent increases for existing tenancies), with L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15, § 151.06(C) (2012) 
(detailing permissible grounds for maximum rent increases, including annual adjustments and 
unrestricted increases during permissible vacancies or evictions).  
 192. Given the assumptions we have made about Sam and Ursula’s near-identical units, we 
can further assume that Larry has at least a somewhat similar desire to evict Ursula on permissible 
grounds, thereby giving him the ability to raise the rent on her unit beyond the limits of the annual 
increases permitted for ongoing tenancies under LARSO as well. For reasons discussed in Part 
III.B, infra, Larry’s desire to raise unassisted Ursula’s rent may be less than his desire to raise 
Section 8–assisted Sam’s rent, but this introductory hypothetical remains instructive so long as 
Larry’s desire to raise Ursula’s rent is at least comparable to his desire to raise Sam’s rent, an 
assumption that need not be compromised by this detail.  
 193. Indeed, the incentives to discriminate against existing Section 8 tenants that would face 
landlords like Larry under such an interpretation of the federal regulations would be far stronger 
than this simple hypothetical might indicate. Under the landlords’ interpretation of the regulations 
advanced in Barrientos and elsewhere, after evicting Sam with the form notice and raising the rent 
of Sam’s former unit by an unrestricted amount, Larry’s revenue would be maximized if he could 
then re-rent the unit for the one-year term to a subsequent Section 8–assisted tenant Stella, followed 
by a similar form notice eviction of Stella that would enable Larry to make yet another unrestricted 
rent increase. Given the long waiting lists of qualified Section 8–assisted tenants seeking apartments 
in Los Angeles and elsewhere, such a course of behavior might well be more than a purely academic 
possibility. In light of the distortions rent control inflicts on the rental housing market, this behavior 
might ultimately lead to the most efficient use and assignment of this specific rental unit. But it 
would frustrate or undermine many of the progressive-property ends served by Section 8. Cf. supra 
Part III.A (setting forth the progressive-property ends served by Section 8).  
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participating in the program across the country, rather than as a ceiling 
that would preempt more searching, local tenant protections where they 
exist, such as the eviction controls found in LARSO.194 Beyond the 
doctrinal preemption issues upon which the litigation facially turned, this 
is the right result from a progressive-property perspective for several 
reasons.195 First, recent progressive-property accounts seek to identify 
and defend systems of property law that will provide a set of rules and 
obligations to protect more vulnerable members of society, whose ability 
to flourish might be harmed by the actions of property owners.196 The 
holding of Barrientos and similar results in related litigation around the 
country achieve this end by protecting the most vulnerable and materially 
disadvantaged parties involved—namely, tenants receiving Section 8 
housing vouchers in rent-controlled apartments—from exploitation by 
their landlords and discriminatory treatment compared to unassisted 
tenants in similar rent-controlled apartments. 
The results of Barrientos and its related litigation also protect 
additional progressive-property values and ends from being drastically 
eroded. For example, the new progressive property seeks to constrain 
and guide the behavior of property owners by emphasizing plural and 
communitarian norms, the social obligations that property owners ought 
to bear toward disadvantaged members of society, and the flourishing 
model for owners and nonowners alike.197 Had Barrientos and its related 
cases turned out the other way, the sorts of long-running Section 8–
assisted tenancies that encourage greater individual and community 
 
 194. See, e.g., Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1215 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding, on the basis of an “analysis of the statutory language and legislative history” of Section 
8, as well as several other factors, “that the HUD regulation and LARSO do not actually conflict” 
because “LARSO does not impede the federal objective of providing affordable housing to low-
income families” and “therefore, is not preempted . . . to the extent the HUD regulation permits 
eviction to obtain a higher rental, in the absence of contrary state or local law”).  
 195. To be clear, while it is important to understand the incentives facing the relevant 
landlords who chose to issue these form notices, I believe that Barrientos was correctly decided and 
that the results of Barrientos and its related litigation are defensible on both progressive and non-
progressive-property grounds. At a theoretical level, however, this litigation is most interesting 
because it serves as a testing ground to explore the new progressive property in some theoretical 
and practical detail. Accordingly, a more fulsome discussion of the other issues involved in this 
litigation, as well as the overall outcome, has been left to other work. For a more detailed 
examination of the legal issues involved in Barrientos, see, for example, Christian Abasto et al., 
HUD Voucher Regulations Do Not Preempt Local Eviction Controls, 43 HOUSING L. BULL. 570 
(2010). 
 196. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
 197. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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development198 would have been even more difficult to achieve than they 
are at present, given the increased economic incentives and enhanced 
ability of landlords to create rapid turnover of their Section 8–assisted 
tenants in rent-controlled units. 
B. Lessons from the Anti-Progressive Conflict at the Intersection of Rent 
Control and Section 8 
In sum, the form notices that gave rise to Barrientos and its related 
litigation were profoundly antithetical to the values endorsed by recent 
progressive-property accounts, while the results of this litigation were 
roughly in accord with the new progressive property. However, the true 
significance of Barrientos and its related cases lies beyond the 
preemption issues they raise and their ultimate result. Rather, from a 
progressive-property perspective, the real significance of this litigation 
lies in the light it sheds on the true extent of the anti-progressive conflict 
at the intersection of the federal Section 8 housing voucher program and 
local rent-control ordinances. 
Put another way, the landlord conduct at issue in Barrientos and the 
related litigation is but one symptom—albeit a clear and unmistakable 
symptom—of a much larger problem for the new progressive-property 
approach. This larger problem can be summarized as follows: the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control drives landlords to inflict many 
different types of disproportionate and significantly anti-progressive 
burdens upon Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, ranging 
far beyond the form notices at issue in Barrientos. To appreciate the 
nature and extent of this deeper problem, one must first rely, in part, 
upon some basic tools of the law-and-economics approach to 
property.199 More specifically, one must apply these basic law-and-
economics tools to some of the well-known anti-progressive side effects of 
rent control,200 to appreciate how these known anti-progressive side 
effects of rent control alone might be exacerbated by the intersection of 
rent control and Section 8. 
 
 198. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 199. For more detail on what I mean by these “basic tools,” see supra notes 20, 60, and 63 
and accompanying text.  
 200. See supra notes 142, 144–147 and accompanying text. In discussing these anti-
progressive side effects of rent control and the combination of rent control and Section 8, I mean 
that they are negative from the standpoint of the new progressive property. Other sorts of 
commonly identified negative side effects of rent control, such as its distorting impact on housing 
market, are not included in this discussion.  
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So, for example, many commentators have claimed that in rent-
controlled jurisdictions, landlords often seek under-the-table bribes from 
prospective or existing tenants to obtain or keep a tenancy, or to obtain 
services nominally guaranteed by lease or law.201 It is easy to explain 
why this occurs if one uses some of the most basic, descriptive tools of 
law-and-economics analysis.202 More specifically, if one assumes that at 
least some landlords are primarily motivated to maximize the full market 
value of their rental units, and if one knows that their efforts to do so are 
frustrated by a local rent-control ordinance, then one should expect such 
landlords to extract part of the rent-controlled difference by soliciting 
bribes from their tenants, backed up with threats of harassment or 
withheld services.203 
This is an obviously anti-progressive side effect of rent control alone: 
far from providing rules that promote virtuous activity and correct 
nonvirtuous property owners,204 rent control encourages illegal bribery 
and threats. Given the nature of Section 8 assistance, existing Section 8–
assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, by their means-tested definition, 
are unable to match the ability of most unassisted existing or unassisted 
prospective tenants to provide these sorts of bribes. Therefore, one ought 
to expect that Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units will bear 
a disproportionate share of the anti-progressive burdens of harassment, 
threats, and withheld services that support these landlord demands. 
From a progressive-property perspective, this compounds the anti-
progressive problems created by rent control alone: under the 
assumptions stated above, at the intersection of Section 8 and rent 
control, one should expect these negative side effects to be inflicted 
 
 201. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 61 (noting the prevalence of “key 
money—a cash bribe for the landlord” paid by some tenants in rent-controlled units); Epstein, supra 
note 140, at 763 (noting “the common practice of paying key money to vacating tenants, or of 
greasing the palm of the superintendent” in rent-controlled jurisdictions). In Los Angeles, roughly 
one-third of the roughly 7,000 annual tenant complaints about possible violations of LARSO 
received by the City of Los Angeles Housing Department relate to allegedly illegal rent increases. 
FLAMING ET AL., supra note 168, at 12. 
 202. See supra notes 20, 60, and 63 and accompanying text. 
 203. Of course, disagreement exists as to how frequently, and under what circumstances, 
landlords engage in the kind of behavior described in notes 201, 206, 208, and the accompanying 
text. See, e.g., Michael J. Mandel, Does Rent Control Hurt Tenants? A Reply to Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1267, 1271, 1273 (1989) (agreeing with Epstein that rent control systems may lead to 
increased conflict between landlords and tenants, but arguing that rent control systems do not 
impact levels of maintenance or building quality).  
 204. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged tenants.205 More 
specifically, application of the basic law-and-economics tools discussed 
above suggests that rent-controlled tenants, especially Section 8–assisted 
rent-controlled tenants, who fail to make under-the-table payments to 
some landlords will face at least two problems: first, landlords will 
withhold services and maintenance nominally guaranteed by lease or 
law; second, landlords will undertake repeated and widespread efforts to 
evict such tenants on flimsy, pretextual, or illegal grounds. 
With respect to the problem of withheld services and maintenance, it 
is relatively well established that rent-controlled units for all types of 
tenants tend to receive substantially lower levels of landlord service and 
maintenance than non-controlled units and, therefore, they tend to be 
substantially more dilapidated.206 By applying the basic tools of law-and-
economics analysis, one can see that the problem will likely be 
exaggerated for Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units. 
Compared to unassisted existing or unassisted potential tenants in rent-
controlled units, Section 8–assisted tenants are relatively unable to make 
the under-the-table payments discussed above. Accordingly, one ought to 
expect that many landlords would allow rent-controlled units inhabited 
by Section 8–assisted tenants to become even more disproportionately 
dilapidated than rent-controlled units inhabited by unassisted tenants. 
From a progressive-property perspective, this compounds the anti-
progressive problem that emerges under rent control alone, for at the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control, the central progressive goal of 
Section 8—namely, providing a decent place to live for low-income 
households—is being directly subverted, as this negative side effect is 
likely being inflicted disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged 
tenants.207 
With respect to the problem of repeated and widespread efforts to 
 
 205. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 206. See, e.g., GLAESER & GYOURKO, supra note 78, at 60 (noting the “abundant evidence on 
rent control and quality deterioration,” and collecting sources that tend to show that “rent-
controlled units” in various jurisdictions are “disproportionately dilapidated”); Epstein, supra note 
140, at 766 (noting that rent control “may well yield a reduction in the level of . . . maintenance and 
security”). In Los Angeles, tenants in rent-controlled units rate their apartments as being in worse 
condition than tenants in non-rent-controlled units, and they are almost twice as likely to rate their 
units as "Very Poor" or "Fairly Poor." ECON. ROUNDTABLE, ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE RENT 
STABILIZATION ORDINANCE AND LA HOUSING MARKET, Powerpoint Briefing to the Housing, 
Community & Economic Development Committee, at 12 (Oct. 7, 2009), available at 
http://bit.ly/REEeKu. 
 207. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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evict tenants on flimsy, pretextual, or illegal grounds, it is also relatively 
well established that rent control generally tends to radically increase a 
landlord’s returns from for-cause evictions or permissible vacancies. 
Simply put, for-cause evictions and permissible vacancies usually provide 
an escape hatch from the constraints of second-generation rent-control 
ordinances.208 By applying the basic law-and-economics descriptive tools 
discussed above, one can see that the problem should become even 
worse, at least from a progressive-property perspective, at the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control. More specifically, given that 
existing Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units are relatively 
unable to make the under-the-table payments discussed above, when 
compared to unassisted existing or potential rent-controlled tenants, one 
would expect landlords to invest disproportionate amounts in stretching 
or manufacturing for-cause grounds to terminate their rent-controlled 
Section 8–assisted tenants’ tenancies.209 
In sum, the use of very basic assumptions and analytic tools from the 
law-and-economics approach strongly suggests that the combination of a 
substantial rent-control program in a city with a significant number of 
Section 8–assisted tenancies will create and then compound these 
serious anti-progressive problems. Rather than providing rules that 
promote virtuous activity and correct the behavior of nonvirtuous 
property owners, the intersection of rent control and Section 8 provides 
incentives for potentially dishonest and even illegal landlord conduct.210 
Moreover, at the intersection of Section 8 and rent control, one should 
expect these negative, anti-progressive side effects to be inflicted 
disproportionately upon the most disadvantaged tenants.211 
Although these basic law-and-economics tools have played a 
 
 208. Epstein, supra note 140, at 764–65 (noting that “rent control laws radically increase the 
landlord’s returns from for cause dismissal” and therefore give landlords “strong incentives to 
exploit minor breaches [of the terms of the tenancy] to escape rent control laws”). In Los Angeles, 
tenant complaints about potential violations of LARSO to the Los Angeles Housing Department 
about false or deceptive eviction notices are almost as common as complaints about illegal rent 
increases. FLAMING ET AL., supra note 176, at 13, 128, 138. 
 209. One might expect this to occur in a variety of overlapping ways: landlords systematically 
exploiting minor breaches of the tenancy by their Section 8 tenants; or worse, from a progressive-
property perspective, landlords investing heavily and disproportionately in efforts to expand the 
frontiers of legally permissible evictions for Section 8 tenants; or worse still, from a progressive-
property perspective, landlords harassing Section 8 tenants into vacating with the threat of such 
eviction actions; or worst of all, from a progressive-property perspective, landlords attempting to 
evict Section 8 tenants for flimsy, pretextual, or even fraudulent reasons. 
 210. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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significant predictive and explanatory role within the broader progressive 
property analysis provided immediately above, more evidence is needed 
to show that the predicted problem for the values and ends of the new 
progressive-property approach actually exists. Such evidence tends to be 
difficult to obtain for at least two reasons: first, because it is inherently 
difficult to identify and measure the predicted pretextual, quasi-legal, or 
illegal landlord behavior beyond assembling anecdotes; and second, 
because there is generally a great dearth of reliable information about 
owner behavior in the Section 8 housing voucher program.212 Here, the 
true significance of Barrientos and its related litigation reveals itself; after 
all, the form notices that gave rise to Barrientos and its related litigation 
are an unmistakable, indeed almost pathognomonic, symptom of the 
problem predicted and described above. 
Basic tools of law-and-economics analysis suggest, for example, that 
some landlords will invest systematically and disproportionately to 
stretch the barriers of permissible eviction of Section 8 tenants to their 
legal limit and beyond to maximize the market returns on these rental 
units by raising the rent without restriction during subsequent 
vacancies.213 And, in fact, this is exactly what happened with the form 
notices at issue in Barrientos and its related litigation. Given the unique 
doctrinal nature of the landlords’ purported preemption justification,214 
the notices themselves are devoid of any pretext or alternative 
explanation.215 The existence of these eviction notices as well as their 
number, expense, and facial language unmistakably suggest that the 
deeply anti-progressive problem described and predicted above exists.216 
The purpose behind the eviction notices employed by the landlord 
groups, revealed by their facial language, was simply and solely to 
maximize the short-term economic value of their rental property. 
Motivated by this purpose—exactly the sort of purpose predicted by the 
 
 212. See, e.g., Brian Maney & Sheila Crowley, Scarcity and Success: Perspectives on Assisted 
Housing, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 319, 329–30 (2000) (noting the generally 
fragmentary and incomplete state of knowledge about Section 8, and noting that in particular, 
“aside from assuming that they want to earn a profit, very little about owners is known”). 
 213. See supra notes 20, 60, 63, 199, 200, 202, and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (discussing the “business or other 
economic reason” component of the federal good-cause eviction standard).  
 215. See supra note 184 (reproducing relevant language from a form notice).  
 216. Namely, that the intersection of Section 8 and rent control drives substantial numbers of 
landlords to invest heavily and disproportionately in attempts, which are directed exclusively at 
Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, to stretch the boundaries of for-cause eviction to 
their legal limit and beyond, solely to maximize the market returns from these units. 
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basic law-and-economics analysis outlined above—substantial numbers of 
landlords were then willing to invest truly substantial sums of money in 
eviction notices that were both legally questionable and sure to be 
litigated, solely to evict their most low-income tenants for immediate or 
short-term financial benefit.217 Barrientos and its related litigation 
therefore confirm the existence of the potential anti-progressive problem 
outlined above: the most basic economic motivations, which may be 
generated by the intersection of two progressive property regimes, are 
capable of pushing property owners to extraordinary anti-progressive 
actions of questionable legality, which tend to be directed 
disproportionately at the most materially disadvantaged members of 
society, further compounding this anti-progressive problem.218 For these 
reasons, Barrientos and its related litigation are most significant for the 
light they shed on the extent and nature of the anti-progressive conflict at 
the intersection of rent control and Section 8, with consequences that 
likely extend far beyond the specific example of landlord conduct at issue 
in these cases.219 
 
 217. To fully appreciate the significance of the investment that landlords were willing to make 
in these form notices, one must move beyond the initial costs of the notices themselves and the 
litigation fees landlords were prepared to pay their own attorneys. Because of relatively common 
fee-switching provisions in the initial leases signed by many of the relevant landlords and tenants, 
which were applicable to legal disputes arising even after the initial lease had elapsed, many of the 
landlords in Barrientos and the related litigation faced the prospect of substantial fee awards to their 
tenants’ attorneys if they initiated such litigation with a form notice and lost in court. Meanwhile, 
their Section 8–assisted tenant opponents, being relatively judgment-proof, did not. Such fee awards 
could often be fairly significant. As an example, the Ninth Circuit upheld an award of $180,029.50 
against the losing landlord in Barrientos for the tenants’ attorney’s fees through the district court 
judgment alone. Barrientos v. 1801–1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 218. Barrientos and its related litigation demonstrate that landlords will invest heavily in 
eviction strategies of questionable but at least unproven legality, based solely on basic economic 
motivations, with substantial and disproportionately anti-progressive effects. Additionally, these 
cases and the notices at their heart also strongly suggest, though they cannot prove, that the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control may drive substantial numbers of landlords to 
disproportionately withhold basic services from Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units, 
as described and predicted above, or to evict Section 8–assisted tenants in rent-controlled units on 
truly pretextual grounds. Given the stated importance of practical and contextual judgment to 
recent progressive-property accounts, the existence of this aspect of the broader problem described 
above should be taken almost as seriously from a progressive-property perspective as the 
disproportionate eviction aspect. See, e.g., Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 
supra note 4, at 744 (claiming that deliberation about property and the plural values it embodies 
“should include non-deductive . . . [and] contextual” reflection). 
 219. Similar anti-progressive conflicts may be found at the intersection of other 
progressive-property regimes and policies. For example, several cases applying the Fair Housing 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2012), show the tension between tenanting procedures designed to 
maintain racially integrated communities and the anti-discrimination mandate of that statute. See, 
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Accordingly, from a progressive-property standpoint, one ought to 
support weakening or eliminating a rent-control ordinance such as 
LARSO to protect the progressive values and ends that are served at 
least as well, and more efficiently, by Section 8. More specifically, 
Section 8 alone is not subject to the anti-progressive effects that arise at 
the intersection of rent control and Section 8. Moreover, although rent 
control alone is subject to many of these same anti-progressive side 
effects, these side effects are significantly worse at the intersection of rent 
control and Section 8. From a progressive-property standpoint, 
therefore, the conflict at the intersection of Section 8 and rent control 
requires a clear choice between promoting either rent control alone or 
Section 8 alone. As argued in Part III above,220 if an anti-progressive 
conflict exists at the intersection of rent control and Section 8, then from 
a progressive-property perspective, one should generally seek to protect 
or advance Section 8 at rent control’s expense. In this context, therefore, 
and contrary to conventional wisdom, the practical implications of the 
new progressive-property approach ought to be the same as the practical 
implications of the law-and-economics approach: under both approaches, 
rent-control ordinances such as LARSO should be eliminated or phased 
out.221 
What lessons can be drawn for future policy and institutional design 
based on the low-income housing conflict generated by the intersection of 
LARSO and the Section 8 housing voucher program? First, as has 
 
e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1098, 1100–01 (2d. Cir. 1988) (noting 
that “[w]hile quotas promote [the Fair Housing Act’s] integration policy, they contravene its 
antidiscrimination policy, bringing the dual goals of the Act into conflict”). (I am grateful to Greg 
Alexander for this particular suggestion.)  
 As this Article suggests, identifying and resolving these conflicts will be one of the great challenges 
facing the new progressive property. For a discussion about what guidelines may be appropriate to 
identify and resolve anti-progressive conflicts similar to the conflict illuminated by Barrientos and its 
related litigation, see infra notes 221–231 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 159–61.  
 221. Of course, many cures for the anti-progressive conflict at the intersection of Section 8 
and rent control might be worse, from the perspective of the new progressive property, than the 
underlying disease. On this point as well, both the new progressive-property approach and the law-
and-economics approach are agreed. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 773 (noting, in the 
context of his arguments against rent control generally, that policy choices about eliminating rent 
control will be complicated because “it is far more difficult to return to unregulated markets than it 
is to maintain them in the first place”). Therefore, a temporary and second-best justification for 
continued rent control from a progressive-property perspective might still be possible in some 
situations, depending on the specific anti-progressive consequences of the available remedies for 
winding up a local rent control regime, and particularly in light of the long waiting lists in many 
localities for Section 8 assistance. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
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already been demonstrated, this conflict shows that the use of even the 
most basic law-and-economics tools, as described above, can be useful 
within a progressive-property approach to help predict and describe 
potential problems arising at the intersection of more or less progressive 
regimes. But the problematic intersection of LARSO and Section 8 
suggests even more basic lessons for the new progressive-property 
approach, particularly with respect to the balancing that is necessary to 
implement its plural values and ends in practice. LARSO was designed to 
address a specific harm facing the community: namely, a shortage of 
decent housing and critically low vacancy levels—identified in the late 
1970s—that had reached “crisis level[s].”222 The intended beneficiaries of 
LARSO are low-income households but also moderate-income 
households, senior citizens, and other persons on fixed incomes.223 In 
contrast, Section 8 is designed to aid low-income families alone in 
obtaining a decent place to live, while also promoting economically 
mixed housing.224 
Section 8 and LARSO both have general communitarian values built 
into their foundations, therefore both are also designed to serve different, 
albeit overlapping, communities of interest. More specifically, Section 8 
is designed to serve low-income families, a goal which fits most closely 
with the new progressive property’s focus on protecting the most 
vulnerable and least advantaged; however, LARSO, like many other local 
rent-control ordinances, is also designed to serve moderate-income 
households,225 a goal that is less central to the new progressive property. 
Beyond the problematic economic incentives facing landlords at the 
intersection of Section 8 and rent control is, therefore, a deeper 
problem—there is no true community of interests at this intersection but 
 
 222. L.A. , CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15,. § 151.01 (2012) (noting, as LARSO’s “Declaration of 
Purpose,” that “[t]here is a shortage of decent, safe and sanitary housing in the City of Los Angeles 
resulting in a critically low vacancy factor,” that “[t]his problem reached crisis level in the summer of 
1978 following the passage of Proposition 13,” and the rent and eviction restrictions of LARSO are 
necessary to address this “crisis” and to prevent its recurrence).  
 223. Id. (noting, in LARSO’s “Declaration of Purpose,” that its measures are intended to 
benefit “senior citizens, persons on fixed incomes, and low and moderate income households”). 
 224. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2011) (“For the purpose of aiding low-income families in 
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing, assistance payments 
may be made with respect to existing housing in accordance with the provisions of this section.”). 
 225. LARSO’s split focus on both low- and moderate-income households is typical of other 
local rent-control ordinances. See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 132, at 40 (noting that “[i]t is true that 
low-income households benefit from rent control, but it is just as true that the middle class benefits 
as well,” and claiming that “it is in fact the middle class who brings [local rent-control ordinances] 
about”).  
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rather three inconsistently treated groups: landlords, whose interests are 
treated neutrally at worst by Section 8 but are harmed by rent control; 
moderate-income tenants, whose interests are treated neutrally at best by 
Section 8 but are expressly favored by rent control;226 and low-income 
tenants, whose interests are expressly favored by both rent control and 
Section 8. 
It should not be surprising that anti-progressive conflict can arise at 
the intersection of two such progressive programs, despite their similar 
aims: both Section 8 and rent control seek to protect certain overlapping 
(but not identical) groups of tenants. Section 8 spreads the expense of 
doing so, however, over the community at large, thereby serving 
progressive ends in a manner superior to rent control. Rent control 
imposes the expense more-or-less directly on yet another group within 
the larger community—landlords. As a result, the intersection of Section 
8 and rent control contains only fractured interest groups, one of which 
has strong economic incentives to act according to the self-interest that is 
singularly used to define it at the expense of progressive-property goals. 
Ultimately, the low-income housing conflict at the intersection of rent 
control and Section 8 suggests that to improve upon past theoretical 
approaches, the new progressive property must recognize and prevent 
similar conflicts in the future by distributing the costs and other burdens 
of progressive property programs as widely as possible. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Designing or defending property regimes that successfully protect the 
most vulnerable members of society or promote communitarian values 
is, at best, a difficult task,227 which some would say is inherently 
misguided or impossible.228 This Article’s close examination of the 
 
 226. Of course, the interests of low- and moderate-income tenants are expressly favored by 
rent control only if they live in rent-controlled units, for despite the general solicitude of most rent-
control ordinances for these groups, low- and moderate-income tenants who rent uncontrolled 
apartments in rent-controlled jurisdictions will be disadvantaged by rent control. 
 227. For another discussion of the difficulty inherent in defending costly property programs 
on communitarian grounds, see Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The 
Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 176–77 (2010) 
(suggesting that any defense of present policy regarding conservation easements held by private land 
trusts must proceed in part on communitarian grounds and noting the difficulty of doing so in light 
of the potential negative side effects and substantial costs of such easements).  
 228. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 140, at 771–72 (claiming that “cant about communitarian 
ideals offers a convenient cloak to allow the ‘haves’ to exclude those unlucky enough not to have 
gotten there first,” and arguing that “[i]f we do not stick with either Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks, then 
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relationship between the Section 8 housing voucher program and 
second-generation rent-control programs such as LARSO suggests that 
this difficult task will be more likely to fail if the property regime in 
question singles out a particular group within the community to bear a 
disproportionate burden of its costs.229 Put another way, the task that 
the new progressive property has set for itself may only be practically 
possible through property regimes like Section 8, which impose the costs 
of greater socioeconomic housing integration and targeted support for 
low-income households on the public at large rather than property 
regimes like second-generation rent controls, which pick out a particular 
group to bear these costs. I have argued above that Section 8 tends to 
balance the plural values of the new progressive property in a way that is 
practically superior to rent control.230 I now conclude that Section 8’s 
approach to the costs imposed by its progressive-property goals also 
makes it more closely aligned with the theoretical underpinnings of 
recent progressive-property accounts than rent control.231 
The new progressive property is a work in progress. Property 
regimes such as rent control and the Section 8 housing voucher program, 
which predate the recent progressive-property accounts by several 
decades, may more or less embody the values and ends that the new 
progressive property seeks to serve. But the real promise of recent 
progressive-property accounts lies in the future: the new progressive 
property, by its own lights, will be an improvement on what has gone 
before to the extent that it can provide a truly practical framework that 
advances communitarian values and concerns for human flourishing, and 
to the extent that it can provide a place for basic law-and-economics tools 
that ultimately serve, rather than simply oppose, these plural values and 
 
the old utilitarian maxim that ‘every person should count for one and only one’ is a far better way to 
do business”).  
 229. Of course, some of the costs of rent control are born by other groups besides landlords. 
See supra note 226. The disadvantage faced by these groups, however, is a side effect of rent 
control, not part of its deliberate design. As a result, the position of landlords under rent control is 
different than the position of these groups, and all groups under Section 8, because rent control 
singles out landlords to bear the brunt of its costs.  
 230. See supra Section IV.B.  
 231. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS 130 (1999) (“What I 
am trying to envisage then is a form of political society in which it is taken for granted that disability 
and dependence on others are something that all of us experience . . . to unpredictable degrees, and 
that consequently our interest in how the needs [of the disabled or dependent are] met is not a 
special interest, the interest of one particular group rather than of others, but rather the interest of the 
whole political society, an interest that is integral to their conception of their common good.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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ends. This Article’s close examination of the intersection of Section 8 
and rent control helps to fill in the emerging picture of the new 
progressive property, in which basic tools and concepts familiar to the 
law-and-economics analysis of property can help predict and describe 
practical problems for progressive values and norms, and more or less 
progressive policy regimes such as rent control may need to be 
abandoned because of their practically anti-progressive side effects. 
 
